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Abstract 
Online platforms, such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon, are constantly expanding their activities 
while increasing the overlap in their service offerings. This paper asks: Is expansion into rival 
platforms’ services profit-maximizing when users’ platform choices endogenously change with 
expansion? We model an expansion game between two online platforms, both incumbents in 
distinct service markets, that provide their services free of charge to users and earn ad-based 
revenues. Platforms decide whether or not to expand by adding the service already offered by their 
rival. Expansion is costly and impacts users’ platform choice—namely, their choice of single- vs. 
multihoming, which, in turn, affects platform prices and profits derived from the advertisers’ side 
of the market. We demonstrate that, in equilibrium, platforms may choose not to expand. Strategic 
“no expansion” decisions are due to the quantity and price effects of changes in the user partition 
resulting from expansion. We further analyze the effects of expansion-driven changes in 
interplatform compatibility, expansion costs, probability of users’ ad engagement, switching costs, 
and intraplatform service complementarity and quality on the optimal expansion strategy. We then 
incorporate these considerations to derive an optimal expansion rule that can be used to guide 
managerial decision-making regarding expansion into a rival’s “territory.” 
Keywords: Media Economics, Entry, Expansion Game, Online Platforms, Two-Sided Markets. 
Kenny Cheng was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on November 30, 2016 and 
underwent two revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Google Plus, Google’s social networking service, was 
introduced in 2011, in the wake of Buzz, Google's 
previous and quite unsuccessful attempt to expand 
into social networking. With 25 million users in one 
month, industry analysts initially dubbed Google Plus 
the “Facebook Killer,” expecting Google Plus to be 
the next Facebook or Twitter. This narrative was quick 
to change. Most Google Plus users were not active, 
 
1https://mashable.com/2013/05/10/google-has-20-million-u-
s-monthly-mobile-users-report-says/#BzNep94D6sqN. 
and in 2012 analysts and bloggers largely referred to 
Google Plus as a “ghost town,” compared to its very 
active and lively counterpart, Facebook. Today, 
Google Plus is defined as a “social layer” on top of 
Google. Its active users are predominantly from the 
tech community and use it mainly for aggregating, 
sharing and discussing news items related to their 
common interests. Nevertheless, while Google Plus 
has 28 million unique monthly visitors1 spending an 
average of around seven minutes on the site, Facebook 
boasts 142 million unique users, spending an average 
 
Strategic Expansion into Rival (Online) Territory 
1476 
of almost seven hours on the site. In the online world, 
where traffic and time spent equal money, Google Plus 
is hardly a success story.,2 
Google Plus is just one example of expansion by an 
online platform into a territory already occupied by a 
rival platform. Google, Facebook, Amazon, and 
Apple—the “big four” of the tech industry—are 
constantly expanding their activities and increasing 
their overlap. Google now competes with incumbent 
Facebook in social networking; conversely, with the 
recent introduction of Facebook Graph Search, 
Facebook also competes with incumbent Google in 
search services. Apple and Amazon compete in selling 
digital media and devices, and additional overlap 
among all these platforms is found in cloud services, 
operating systems, smartphones, e-commerce, etc. 
With new services and products added each month, the 
overlap in the activities of these giants will only 
increase as each strives to provide a one-stop shop for 
their users.3 
And to what end? A major driver of the expansion of 
these platforms is the cultivation of exclusive and 
intimate relationships with users, which they anticipate 
will translate into large advertising revenues4,5 (e.g., 
through improved ad targeting; see Kang, 2012). 
Indeed, both Facebook and Google’s revenue comes 
predominantly from advertising, and in 2013 Amazon 
launched its ad exchange, allowing for the retargeting 
of shoppers after they leave Amazon.com (Edwards, 
2012; Griffith, 2012; Taube, 2013). 
For this paper we examined optimal expansion 
strategies of online ad-financed platforms, focusing on 
expansion into services already offered by rival 
platforms, a practice that has become pervasive in 
today’s tech landscape. This paper presents a modeling 
framework that helps formulate answers to the 
following questions: Should ad-financed platforms 
always strive to expand their service offerings by 
adding rivals’ existing services? Under what 
circumstances is platform imperialism a profit-
maximizing strategy? What are the effects of 
expansion costs on users’ response to advertising, 
 
2 Tassy (2011), Evans (2013), and Warren (2013) discuss 
Google Plus’s evolution and current state. 
3 Also see The Economist, December 1, 2012. 
4 Evans (2009) surveys the evolution of online advertising 
methods, provides some industry numbers, and discusses 
privacy concerns. 
5 Google’s ad revenue is now larger than that of the entire US 
print media, according to Edwards 2013. 
6  The early literature on multisided platform markets has 
largely focused on platforms’ pricing strategies, under 
varying assumptions regarding market characteristics (see, 
e.g., Armstrong 2006; Hagiu, 2006, 2009b; Cabral, 2011; 
Caillaud & Jullien, 2001, 2003; Chen, Dou, & Wu, 2012; 
Halaburda & Yehezkel, 2013, 2016; Jullien, 2008; Parker & 
Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 2003, 2006; 
service quality, intraplatform complementarity, and 
interplatform compatibility on the optimal expansion 
strategies?  
Through an analysis of a platform expansion game, we 
thus provide a timely addition to the growing literature 
on various strategic behaviors in platform markets.6 
Recent work has examined platform strategies such as 
openness and developer property rights (Boudreau, 
2010; Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2008; 
Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018), compatibility with rival 
platforms (Adner, Chen, & Zhu, 2015; Casadesus-
Masanell & Ruiz-Aliseda, 2009), the choice of 
exclusive contracts versus multihoming (Hagiu & Lee, 
2011), tying (Amelio & Jullien 2012; Choi, 2010), 
exclusion of some user types (Hagiu, 2011), and 
strategic preannouncement (Chellapa & Mukherjee 
2015), to name but a few.7  
Within this literature, a few works have examined 
platform expansion or entry; papers by Eisenmann, 
Parker, & Van Alstyne (2011) and Zhu & Iansiti 
(2012) are most closely related to our work. These 
papers study one-sided decisions by an entrant or 
“attacker” platform, deriving conditions for successful 
attacks on an incumbent’s market. Specifically, 
Eisenmann et al. (2011) focus on the impact of 
complementarity levels between the attacker and target 
platforms, whereas Zhu and Iansiti (2012) focus on the 
impact of platform quality, indirect network effects, 
and consumer expectations on the entrant’s success.  
Our contribution to the existing literature is thus 
threefold: (1) We analyze a strategic expansion game 
between two platforms that are incumbents in their 
respective markets and that are both considering 
expansion into the rival platform’s market. As such, 
expansion is not a one-sided activity but rather a 
strategic interaction between platforms because their 
expansion decisions interact with and affect each other. 
Highlighting strategic interaction provides a more 
realistic representation of platform expansion 
decisions, as current digital platform markets are 
largely dominated by a small number of competing 
firms responding to each other’s actions.8 (2) Within 
Weyl, 2010). More recently, the platforms literature has been 
evolving to consider strategies other than pricing. 
7 Also see Boudreau and Hagiu (2008), Eisenmann, Parker 
and Van Alstyne (2006), and Hagiu (2009a), who analyze 
case studies in their discussions of different strategies in 
platform markets. 
8 We use the term “strategic expansion” in a game-theoretic 
sense, as explained in the text. We also note that the strategic 
expansion studied is the addition of a new service to the 
platform’s core offering, which affects the competition 
between the two incumbent platforms. Further details are 
provided below. 
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this strategic interaction framework, we study the 
resulting expansion equilibrium and identify the 
conditions that lead to expansion by both platforms, 
one platform, or none of the platforms. (3) We study 
the effect of various factors on platforms’ optimal 
expansion strategies, such as interplatform 
compatibility, intraplatform service complementarity, 
expansion costs, service quality, switching costs, and 
user response rates to ads. This paper thus provides a 
comprehensive view of expansion drivers and 
inhibitors through the medium of our strategic game, 
which will serve as a useful guide for practitioner 
decision-making. 
We model a market with two platforms through which 
advertisers may reach potential buyers (platform 
users). The platforms provide free services to users, 
generating revenue by selling users’ ad engagement (or 
ad-related actions) 9  to advertisers, 10  where ad 
engagement represents a positive cross-side network 
effect of potential buyers on the advertisers’ side of the 
market (e.g., Eisenman et al., 2006). At the outset, each 
platform offers one service type, and buyers optimally 
choose which platform(s) to use, inducing the initial 
buyer partition. 
Platforms engage in an expansion game, in which each 
platform strategically chooses whether or not to 
expand by adding the type of service already offered 
by its rival. We specifically consider expansion that 
may affect the overlap in platforms’ user bases, or the 
degree of multihoming. This potential impact of 
expansion is the main driver of the strategic interaction 
studied in the model. 
The game proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, 
platforms make their expansion decisions, which affect 
buyers’ platform choice and thus determine the final 
buyer partition. In the second stage, platforms set 
prices per user action charged to advertisers, given the 
buyer partition. Advertisers then observe platform 
prices and the buyer partition and choose where to 
place their ads, which, in turn, determines platforms’ 
expected profits.  
Endogeneity of the buyer partition is an important 
feature in our setting, resulting from changes in the 
level of compatibility between the platforms brought 
on by expansion. We consider both increases and 
decreases in compatibility following expansion, 
capturing two possible scenarios: (1) expansion is 
aimed at creating a one-stop shop for users, therefore 
 
9 Pay per performance or per user action has become the most 
common pricing model for online advertising, where 
advertisers are charged based on a prespecified user action, 
where this may be, for instance, engagement with the ad, a 
click, sale, subscription, or form submission (see 
http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_Internet_Advertising_R
evenue_Report_FY_2013.pdf ).  
compatibility with the rival platform is decreased; (2) 
expansion that adds the rival’s core service requires 
intraplatform service compatibility that may increase 
interplatform compatibility as a side effect (since the 
new service is the same as the rival’s core offering). 
Such changes in platform compatibility affect users’ 
single- and multihoming behaviors, and thus the buyer 
partition and resulting cross-side network effect for 
different pairs of expansion decisions. 
The basic motivation for expansion in our setting is 
increasing users’ probability of ad engagement, as a 
result of ad exposure occurring on an additional 
service. This implies that if the buyer partition were 
exogenous, then expansion would always increase 
expected profits, due to the increase in the expected 
quantity of ad-engagement events sold to advertisers. 
Endogeneity of the buyer partition in our setting 
implies that this benefit of expansion must be weighed 
against the effects of changes in the user partition. 
We distinguish between two effects associated with the 
endogeneity of the partition of buyers: a quantity effect 
and a price effect. The former is a direct effect resulting 
from the change in user partition that may either 
increase or decrease the total number of potential 
buyers reached through the platform 11  following 
expansion, thereby affecting expected profits. The 
latter is an indirect effect, as equilibrium prices per 
user action decrease according to the degree of 
multihoming. This is because, in equilibrium, prices 
are set such that advertisers place ads on both platforms 
but do not pay double for reaching multihomers twice.  
Considering the above effects of expansion, as well as 
platforms’ expansion costs, users’ switching costs, and 
various benefits to users from expansion, we derive 
conditions for optimal expansion and no-expansion. 
We find that expansion is a dominant strategy when it 
decreases multihoming, increases exclusivity, and 
when its cost is relatively low, while no-expansion 
may be optimal when the cost of expansion is higher 
or when users’ multihoming increases with expansion. 
This allows us to characterize expansion equilibria for 
different parameter spaces. We show that different 
types of equilibria may arise depending on the 
magnitude of the effects discussed. Notably, 
asymmetric expansion may be an equilibrium even for 
symmetric platforms, and symmetric no-expansion 
may also be optimal when the benefits of expansion are 
lower than its cost. 
10 The advertisers’ side of the market fully subsidizes the 
buyers’ side. This price structure is commonly assumed in 
the media platforms literature (e.g., Ambrus, Calvano, & 
Reisinger, 2013; Anderson & Coate, 2005; Anderson, Foros, 
Kind, & Peitz, 2012; Reisinger, 2012). 
11  Note that both exclusive and multihoming users are 
reached, yet the two user types differ in their probability of 
responding to an ad. 
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We further analyze the effects of our model 
parameters on optimal expansion strategies. Increases 
in the expansion cost, users’ switching cost, and core 
service quality, may lead to equilibrium no-expansion. 
Similarly, decreases in the probability of ad 
engagement, in the quality of the added service, and 
in the complementarity between same-platform 
services may also impact optimal expansion 
strategies, as will changes in interplatform 
compatibility levels. These factors are all represented 
in the optimal expansion rule (OER) derived in this 
paper, which may be used to structure debates 
surrounding platform expansion decisions. 
We thus offer the following contributions for 
managers and researchers of digital platforms: (1) We 
provide a structured framework for consideration of 
platform expansion, which incorporates various 
factors, including expansion cost, expansion effects 
on same-platform service complementarity, users’ 
switching costs, platform compatibility, users’ ad-
engagement rates, and more. (2) Our analysis cautions 
against the prevalent practice of “platform 
imperialism,” by deriving market conditions for 
optimal expansion and, importantly, optimal no-
expansion. (3) We show that a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
may arise, highlighting the circumstances when 
expansion is individually rational, but yields lower 
profits than coordinated no-expansion. These 
contributions are unique to our game-theoretic 
framework and are particularly relevant for today’s 
largely oligopolistic digital platform markets. 
In the following, Section 2 reviews the related 
literature; the model is then set up in Section 3 and 
analyzed in section 4. We offer concluding remarks 
and a discussion of managerial implications in Section 
5. 
2 Related Literature  
Studying advertising-financed platforms, we relate to 
the literature on media platforms. This literature has 
examined equilibrium ad prices, levels of advertising, 
content differentiation, and platform entry (e.g., 
Ambrus et al, 2013; Anderson & Coate 2005; 
Anderson, Foros, & Kind, 2011; Anderson et al., 
2012; Crampes, Haritchabalet, & Jullien, 2009; 
Reisinger, 2012). Compared to these papers, we 
simplify by assuming that advertisers are 
homogeneous, and by focusing on the positive cross-
side network effect exerted by potential consumers on 
 
12  Users’ annoyance from ad exposure is assumed to be 
exogenous and constant, and thus normalized to zero. 
13 When tracking technologies are imperfect. 
14 Aside from this similar notion of redundancy, our paper 
differs substantially from both of these papers that study 
different research questions, employing different model set-
ups. 
advertisers, 12  in order to allow for tractability in 
solving the two-stage expansion game.  
Still, the main assumptions of our model are consistent 
with previous work in the media platforms literature. 
Advertisers in our model may multihome, as is 
common in the literature (an exception is Reisinger 
2012). We further allow for user multihoming, as in 
Ambrus et al. (2013), Anderson et al. (2011), 
Anderson et al. (2012), and Athey, Calvano, and Gans 
(2013). 
User multihoming creates some redundancy for 
multihoming advertisers in our model, and thus gives 
rise to pricing which follows the “principle of 
incremental pricing” defined in Anderson et al. 
(2011). Namely, prices are determined according to 
the incremental benefit of placing ads on an additional 
platform, thereby internalizing the redundancy for 
multihoming advertisers. A similar notion of 
redundancy in advertising arises in Athey et al. (2013) 
as a result of consumer switching.13,14 
Note that in our model there is only partial redundancy 
from reaching multihoming users twice, as users’ 
probability of an ad-related action increases with ad 
exposure on an additional service. As a result, the 
degree of user multihoming exerts a negative effect on 
prices. This is in contrast to Anderson et al. (2011), 
where the redundancy is full and the degree of 
multihoming does not directly affect ad pricing. On 
the other hand, and quite naturally, user exclusivity 
has a positive effect on prices in both papers.15  
Related to our paper, Eisenmann et al. (2011) and Zhu 
and Iansiti (2012) have studied entry or expansion by 
one platform into another platform’s market. 
Eisenmann et al. (2011) dub this practice an 
“envelopment attack,” and build a typology of attacks 
based on the level of complementarity between the 
attacker and target platforms, deriving conditions for 
successful attacks. Zhu and Iansiti (2012) develop a 
theoretical model to examine the relative importance 
of platform quality, indirect network effects, and 
consumer expectations on the entrant’s success. We, 
on the other hand, model a strategic expansion game 
between two platforms; we do not label one platform 
an “attacker” or “entrant,” both platforms may or may 
not expand and conditions for different types of 
expansion equilibria are derived. 
15  In Athey et al. (2013), prices may either increase or 
decrease with consumer switching, as a result of the specific 
modeling of the switching process. 
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3 The Model 
We model a market with two platforms offering online 
services to buyers or platform users, in order to attract 
advertisers who would like users to engage with their 
ads. Platforms thus connect advertisers with potential 
buyers, facilitating a cross-side network effect of the 
buyer side on the advertiser side of the market. 
Platforms are ad financed, and advertising revenues are 
collected based on users’ ad-related actions (this 
constitutes the common pay-per-performance 
model).16 
The focus of the model is platforms’ strategic 
expansion behavior when the buyer partition is 
endogenous, and thus changes with expansion 
decisions. We analyze an entry or expansion game 
between the two platforms, in which each platform 
may or may not expand by adding the service initially 
offered by the rival platform. Following expansion 
decisions, platforms set prices per user action charged 
to advertisers. Advertisers observe the partition of 
buyers resulting from platforms’ expansion decisions 
as well as platform prices and choose their advertising 
strategy: placing ads on both platforms, placing an ad 
on one of the platforms, or not advertising at all.   
3.1 Platforms: Basic Assumptions and 
Notation 
There are two platforms in the market; let 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
denote the platform index. At the outset, each platform 
provides one service, its core service, that is different 
from the one provided by its rival. Platform services 
are provided to users free of charge. A strategy for 
platform 𝑖  is a couple (𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖) , where 𝑒𝑖 ∈ {𝐸, ?̅?} 
represents the platform‘s expansion decision—either 
“expansion” (denoted 𝐸) or “no-expansion” (denoted 
?̅?), and 𝑝𝑖 ∈ [0,∞) is the price per user action charged 
to advertisers on the platform. Let (𝑒1, 𝑒2)  denote a 
pair of expansion decisions, and 𝑛 ∈ {0,1,2}  the 
number of expanded platforms. We assume that 
platforms expand only by adding the service already 
offered by their rival. 
The quality of platforms’ core services is denoted 𝑞, 
and expansion implies adding a second service of 
quality  Δ𝑞 ∈ (0, 𝑞).17  Platforms’ initial or core 
services are thus assumed to be of higher quality than 
newly added services, as a baseline case. We allow for 
complementarity between platform services or, 
equivalently, a quality enhancement for the newly 
 
16 In pay-per-performance ad pricing, advertisers are charged 
based on users’ ad-related actions, such as engagement with 
the ad, a click, sale, or form submission. See 
http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_Internet_Advertising_R
evenue_Report_FY_2013.pdf. 
17 Importantly, the strategic interaction we study is not driven 
by this quality increment, but rather by buyers’ potential for 
added service. This complementarity (or quality) 
benefit is denoted as 𝜇𝑏~ 𝑈[0, 𝜇], where subscript 𝑏 
represents a buyer-specific realization, such that 𝜇𝑏 is 
the subjective enjoyment of buyer 𝑏  from the 
incremental benefits, uniformly distributed across the 
buyer population. The total quality offered by platform 
𝑖 is denoted 𝑞𝑖, such that 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞 for 𝑒𝑖 = ?̅?, and 𝑞𝑖 =
𝑞 + Δ𝑞 + 𝜇𝑏 for  𝑒𝑖 = 𝐸. 
Expansion entails a fixed cost for platforms, 
represented by the constant 𝑐 ≥ 0 . Generally, we 
denote total cost for 𝑖  as 𝐶𝑒𝑖 , such that 𝐶𝐸 = 0  and 
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑐. 
Platforms are assumed to be symmetric, offering the 
same quality of core and added services, the same 
distribution for service complementarity (or quality 
enhancement) benefits, 𝜇𝑏 , and incurring the same 
fixed cost for expansion. Clearly, this may not be the 
case in most real-world situations. But rather than 
restrict our analysis, this will demonstrate that platform 
asymmetry is not required to obtain nontrivial 
equilibrium outcomes (including equilibria with 
asymmetric expansion). 
Platform revenues are derived from user ad actions 
sold to advertisers, where these ad actions represent a 
positive indirect network effect of the buyer side on the 
advertiser side of the market. We thus turn to introduce 
assumptions regarding buyers and advertisers in the 
market. 
3.2 Buyers 
There is a unit mass of buyers in the market. Buyers 
choose which platform(s) they subscribe to, and this 
yields the buyer partition—a partition of the buyer 
population into three groups comprising exclusive 
users of Platforms 1 and 2 and multihomers.  
We define multihoming users as those who subscribe 
to each platform’s core service, i.e., its original, pre-
expansion, offering. Postexpansion, the same 
definition of multihoming continues to hold. While, in 
reality, users may subscribe to the same type of service 
from both platforms postexpansion, we assume that 
they primarily use only one service of a certain type, 
as same-type services are substitutes. 
The buyer partition is a function of platforms’ 
expansion decisions  (𝑒1, 𝑒2) , denoted 𝐵
𝑒1𝑒2 ≡
{𝑏1
𝑒1𝑒2 , 𝑏2
𝑒1𝑒2 , 𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2} , where 𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2  is the group of 
platform 𝑖’s exclusive subscribers and its mass, and 
switching following expansion decisions and the 
endogeneity of interplatform compatibility. Still, higher total 
quality for expanded platforms is assumed to provide a more 
realistic and comprehensive view of expansion. 
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𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2  is the group of multihomers and its mass, for 
(𝑒1, 𝑒2). We assume that the market is covered for any 
(𝑒1, 𝑒2), such that, 𝑏1
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝑏2
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 = 1.18 
We will consider both the initial and final buyer 
partition, as buyers choose platforms twice. Their 
initial choice is made before platforms decide on 
expansion and without anticipating possible 
expansion. This results in the initial buyer partition 
𝐵?̅??̅? . Following expansion decisions, buyers may 
switch away from their initial subscription choices, 
which results in the final buyer partition 𝐵𝑒1𝑒2 , 
where 𝑒1, 𝑒2 ∈ {?̅?, 𝐸} . The buyer partition is 
determined in equilibrium as a result of buyers’ utility 
maximization, defined as follows. 
3.2.1 Buyer Utility 
Buyer utility is linear in the total quality of platform 
services. For exclusive platform 𝑖  users, this total 
quality is 𝑞𝑖 (defined above), and for multihomers total 
quality is 2𝑞  (the sum of the two core services’ 
quality). 
Multihomers incur heterogeneous and endogenously 
determined compatibility costs (or multihoming costs). 
We specifically consider users who draw a baseline 
compatibility cost once at the outset from 𝑈[0,1], and 
then experience an increase or decrease in this cost, as 
a result of platforms’ expansion decisions. The change 
in multihoming cost is the same across users, such that 
each user maintains the same relative cost compared to 
his or her peers. 
Expansion-induced changes in compatibility costs 
represent changes in platform compatibility resulting 
from the addition of the rival’s core service. We 
explore both the case of (weakly) increasing and 
decreasing compatibility costs, 19  motivated by the 
following possible scenarios: 
Increasing (or weakly increasing) compatibility 
costs: Expansion aims to create a one-stop shop, and 
 
18 This assumption is standard in the literature (e.g., Choi, 
2010; Rasch & Wenzel, 2014; Veiga & Weyl, 2016). It is 
assumed here to simplify the analysis and highlight the effect 
of changes in buyers’ subscription choices following 
platform expansion, yet it is not necessary for obtaining our 
main results. 
19 The case where expansion does not impact compatibility 
costs is qualitatively similar to the case where expansion 
increases compatibility costs, and these are markedly 
different from the case where expansion decreases 
compatibility costs. Therefore, weak increases in 
compatibility costs are considered as one case, distinct from 
the case of decreases in compatibility costs following 
expansion (see section 4.3). 
20  Both of these expansion attempts did not decrease 
multihoming, due to both incumbents’ market power in their 
thus decreases the expanding platform’s compatibility 
with the rival, making multihoming costlier. Returning 
to the Google-Facebook example, Google Plus was 
intended to create a rival social networking service to 
fulfill yet one more need for Google users. Since 
Google Plus allows users already signed into their 
Google accounts to participate in social networking 
that is integrated with other Google services, it thereby 
(weakly) increases the relative cost of multihoming, 
i.e., using Facebook for social networking. This same 
“one-stop shop” argument could be applied to 
Facebook’s introduction of search, which reduces the 
need to leave Facebook to conduct certain types of 
search queries, and thus increases (at least weakly) the 
cost of multihoming. 20  Of course, more successful 
one-stop shops were created by Google and Apple in 
their competition in the markets for devices, gadgets 
and compatible apps, 21  where expansion into 
overlapping apps and services was accompanied by 
decreased compatibility, leading users to identify with 
only one ecosystem over time.22 
Decreasing compatibility costs—two scenarios: In 
the first scenario of decreasing compatibility costs, the 
newly added service is designed to be compatible with 
the core service, whereas the latter may be further 
tweaked to increase compatibility. Since the newly 
added service is the same as the rival’s core service, a 
possible side-effect is increased compatibility between 
the two core services, which decreases multihoming 
costs. A case in point is the ongoing competition 
between Snapchat and Instagram. Instagram, which set 
out as a photo-sharing app, and Snapchat, a multimedia 
messaging app, have both expanded their services and 
have become very similar over time. Specifically, in 
2016, Instagram launched its “Stories” feature, which 
essentially copies Snapchat’s Stories functionality.23 
While this expansion into the Snapchat realm was 
intended to steal users away from the rival, for many 
users this increased similarity facilitated multihoming, 
evidenced by the number of users cross-posting the 
same content on both platforms.24 
core services derived from strong same-side network effects 
(which are not the focus of this paper). 
21 See https://www.cnet.com/news/google-wants-to-
become-the-one-stop-shop-of-tech/ and 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysondemers/2015/06/22/is-
google-trying-to-become-a-one-stop-shop-for-everything-
online/#5622489dea14  
22  See, for example, https://fieldguide.gizmodo.com/why-
choosing-between-android-and-ios-still-matters-
1822976032. 
23 https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/02/instagram-stories/.  
24 This is especially common for those using the platforms 
for brand and personal marketing. See 
https://daveyandkrista.com/audience-how-to-add-your-
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In the second scenario of decreasing compatibility 
costs, expansion leads to exclusive users learning 
about the new service offering, which may lead to 
increased awareness of the rival’s similar offering (its 
core service), thus leading to lower multihoming costs 
as a result of expansion. Expansions into the e-retail 
space are a prime example of this scenario. Consider 
Google’s attempts to establish an e-commerce service 
(with Google Shopping, Google Express and, recently, 
Google Shopping Actions25). In the course of these 
attempts, Google has noted that many product searches 
initiated on Google conclude with purchases on 
Amazon. 26  This is because, for many users, 
information on product offerings, availability, and 
prices on Google, reduces search time on Amazon, and 
thus increases interplatform compatibility and 
decreases multihoming costs. 
The above scenarios are represented in the model by 
endogenous compatibility costs. Formally, we denote 
user 𝑏’s baseline compatibility cost by 𝑚𝑏~𝑈[0,1], 
and the change in this cost following expansion by 
Δ𝑚𝑛  (recall that 𝑛 ∈ {0,1,2}  is the number of 
expanded platforms), where Δ𝑚0 = 0 and Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 
are either (weakly) positive or negative constants (we 
allow Δ𝑚1 ≠ Δ𝑚2 ). User 𝑏 ’s compatibility cost is 
thus 𝑚𝑏
𝑒1𝑒2 ≡ 𝑚𝑏 +  Δ𝑚
𝑛 . This specification, chosen 
for its simplicity and realism, will allow for a tractable 
analysis. 
We further assume that:  
1. |Δ𝑚1|, |Δ𝑚2| < 𝑞 : Changes in users’ 
compatibility costs following expansion do not 
exceed the utility derived from the core 
service’s quality. 
2. 𝜇 < 𝑞: The upper bound for users’ utility from 
same-platform service complementarity does 
not exceed the utility derived from the core 
service’s quality. 
These assumptions limit the number of cases we 
consider, allowing us to focus on more plausible 
parameter values. 
Utility for user 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 is written as: 
𝑢𝑖
𝑏 = 𝑞𝑖
𝑢12
𝑏 = 2𝑞 − 𝑚𝑏
𝑒1𝑒2  (1) 
 
snapchat-story-to-your-instagram-story/ and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PSH9kCFJJhY.  
25 See https://commerce.googleblog.com/2012/05/building-
better-shopping-experience.html and 
https://www.techtimes.com/articles/223291/20180320/goog
le-is-trying-to-take-on-amazon-via-product-placements-on-
google-search.htm. 
Where 𝑢𝑖
𝑏  is 𝑏’s utility from subscription to a single 
platform 𝑖  (i.e., singlehoming on 𝑖 ) and 𝑢12
𝑏  is 𝑏 ’s 
utility from multihoming.27 
Since users do not anticipate platform expansion, they 
are therefore likely to choose platforms twice. They 
make an initial subscription choice before expansion 
decisions are made and may then switch to another 
choice following platform expansion. Switching to a 
new choice is costly, such that the utility for a 
switching user 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵  from a new choice 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈
{1,2,12} is 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑏 − 𝑠, where 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑏  is defined in Eq. (1) 
and 𝑠 ≥ 0  is the switching cost incurred. To 
summarize, a user’s initial platform choice is made 
given his or her individual realization of 𝑚𝑏, and the 
final platform choice (following expansion decisions) 
is made given 𝑚𝑏
𝑒1𝑒2  , with a switching cost of 𝑠.  
Users’ platform choices for each pair (𝑒1, 𝑒2) 
maximize utility. We make two tie-breaking 
assumptions. First, we assume that indifference 
between the two platforms is resolved by a fair coin 
flip, i.e., users indifferent between Platform 1 and 2 
will choose each platform with a probability of 0.5. 
This represents an idiosyncratic platform preference 
when platforms offer exactly the same total quality 
level. Second, we assume that indifference between 
multihoming and the choice of a single platform is 
resolved in favor of multihoming. 
3.2.2 Buyer Equilibrium 
Definition 1: Buyer equilibrium is a choice of 
platform(s) for each buyer 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 given (𝑒1, 𝑒2), 
such that each buyer’s choice is utility 
maximizing, given 𝑚𝑏
𝑒1𝑒2  and 𝑠. 
A partition 𝐵𝑒1𝑒2  thus constitutes buyer equilibrium 
given (𝑒1, 𝑒2) . Endogeneity of 𝐵
𝑒1𝑒2  is the result of 
expansion-induced changes in compatibility costs, 
which, in turn, represent endogenous interplatform 
compatibility levels. 
3.2.3 Buyers’ Probability of Ad Engagement 
Advertising on the platforms is aimed at generating 
user engagement with the ad or the advertiser. The ad-
engagement event can take different forms, where the 
ad action for which advertisers pay is usually campaign 
specific. Examples of ad actions include a sale, click, 
registration, form submission, or any type of 
engagement solicited by the advertisement.  
26  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-retail-exclusive/ 
exclusive-where-can-i-buy-google-makes-push-to-turn-
product-searches-into-cash-idUSKBN1GV0B0  
27 Note that utility does not depend on users’ expectations 
regarding the number of subscribers on each platform, i.e., 
we abstract from modeling the same-side network effect. We 
further discuss this assumption in section 5. 
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The expected number of ad-related actions, or 
engagement events, generated by each group of 
buyers depends on its mass and response rate. The 
response rate is the probability that a user engages 
with an ad, where ad exposure occurs via platform 
services. Let 𝜌 ∈ (0,1)  denote users’ ad-action 
probability, for ad exposure on one service. We 
assume that ad actions are independent across 
services, such that a user exposed to an ad on two 
services will engage with the ad exactly once with 
probability 2𝜌(1 − 𝜌), twice with probability 𝜌2, and 
will not engage at all with probability (1 − 𝜌)2. This 
represents the basic motivation for platform 
expansion—improving users’ overall ad-engagement 
probability by increasing the number of contact points 
with the platform’s user base. 
3.3 Advertisers 
There is a unit mass of homogeneous advertisers in the 
market who aim to reach potential buyers by placing 
ads on the platforms. Platform users’ ad engagement 
generates a positive cross-side network effect of the 
buyer side on the advertiser side of the market, and 
thus drives advertisers’ participation in the platform 
market. Advertisers’ strategy is a choice of platform 
or platforms on which to place ads, denoted 𝛼 ∈ 𝐴 ≡
{{1}, {2}, {1,2}, ∅}.  
The expected benefit of 𝜶. Advertisers benefit from 
unique user ad actions, i.e., a second action by the 
same user is considered redundant. This is represented 
by a constant value for a user’s first engagement 
event, normalized to 1, whereas the value of a user’s 
second engagement event is zero.28 We introduce the 
notation ?̃? ≡ 2𝜌 − 𝜌2, which is the probability of at 
least one user action, when reaching the same user on 
two services. ?̃?  is thus the relevant engagement 
probability when considering the benefit of ad 
exposure on two services (i.e., for an expanded 
platform).  
The expected benefit of 𝛼 is the cross-side network 
effect of buyers on advertisers, defined as the product 
of the relevant engagement probability and the mass 
of users reached. Notably, the mass of users reached 
via platform 𝑖 includes both its exclusive subscribers 
and its multihoming users, who subscribe to one 
service from each platform. When advertising on a 
single platform, 𝛼 = {𝑖} , the expected benefit is 
simply 𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 , where 𝜌𝑖 ≡ 𝜌𝑖(𝑒𝑖) 
represents the probability of a unique engagement 
 
28  This is likely the case when the engagement event is 
defined as a form submission (e.g., registration), a click, or 
an ad impression. 
29  Multihoming advertisers are thus required to pay for 
redundant actions. An alternative modeling choice is to 
assume that platforms identify multihoming users, and 
event and depends on the platform’s expansion 
decision, such that 𝜌𝑖(?̅?) = 𝜌 and 𝜌𝑖(𝐸) = ?̃?. When 
advertising on both platforms, 𝛼 = {1,2} , the 
expected benefit is 𝜌1𝑏1
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌2𝑏2
𝑒1𝑒2 + ?̃?𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 , since 
multihomers are now reached through two services 
and ?̃? is their relevant engagement probability. 
The expected cost of 𝜶 . The expected cost is the 
amount charged by the platforms in the advertiser’s 
choice set, 𝛼, which is, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝛼, the product of 
the price per action and the expected number of ad 
actions provided. Considering the expected number of 
actions provided by 𝑖 , we assume that the platform 
perfectly tracks its exclusive users, and thus charges 
advertisers only for unique actions by these users,  
𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 . On the other hand, multihomers subscribe to 
only one of the platform’s services and are not tracked 
outside of the platform. Each platform thus provides 
𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2  expected actions by these users. 29 
Summarizing, each platform 𝑖 ∈ 𝛼  charges its 
advertisers a sum of 𝑝𝑖[𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2]. 
The expected value of choice 𝛼  is defined as the 
difference between the expected benefit and the cost 
of 𝛼 , and is denoted as 𝑉𝛼 ≡
𝑉(𝛼|(𝑒𝑖, 𝑝𝑖)𝑖=1,2, 𝐵
𝑒1𝑒2  ): 
𝑉𝛼
=
{
 
 
 
 
(1 − 𝑝𝑖)[𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2]                  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 = {𝑖}
[𝜌1𝑏1
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌2𝑏2
𝑒1𝑒2 + ?̃?𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2]                                 
          −𝑝1[𝜌1𝑏1
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2]                               
              −𝑝2[𝜌2𝑏2
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2]        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 = {1,2}
0                                                                    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 = ∅
 
(2) 
 
The important feature of 𝑉𝛼  is that advertiser 
multihoming, or 𝛼 = {1,2}, entails some redundancy, 
as multihoming users are reached twice and 
advertisers pay both platforms for their ad actions. 
Specifically, when 𝛼 = {1,2}, access to multihoming 
users provides an expected benefit of ?̃?𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 , at an 
expected cost of (𝑝1 + 𝑝2)𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 , where 𝜌 < ?̃? < 2𝜌. 
Therefore, 𝑉12 < 𝑉1 + 𝑉2.  
We assume that advertiser indifference between 𝛼 =
{1,2} and 𝛼 = {𝑖} is resolved in favor of 𝛼 = {1,2}. 
3.4 Platforms: Profits 
Each pair of platform expansion decisions (𝑒1, 𝑒2) 
defines an expansion subgame and determines 𝐵𝑒1𝑒2  
therefore the expected cost of their actions is computed 
according to an engagement probability of 0.5?̃?. Our main 
results continue to hold under this alternative assumption, as 
𝑉12 < 𝑉1 + 𝑉2 continues to hold. 
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in the subgame. Platform 𝑖 ’s expected profit in an 
expansion subgame (𝑒1, 𝑒2)  for price 𝑝𝑖 , given the 
rival’s price 𝑝𝑗 , and cost 𝐶
𝑒𝑖  is denoted as 
𝜋𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2(𝑝𝑖| 𝑝𝑗) . Platform profit is the product of its 
price per action 𝑝𝑖  and the number of ad actions 
provided, minus the cost 𝐶𝑒𝑖 . The number of actions 
provided is positive if the platform is chosen by 
advertisers (𝑖 ∈ 𝛼) and zero otherwise. Therefore: 
𝜋𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2(𝑝𝑖| 𝑝𝑗)
= {
𝑝𝑖[𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2] − 𝐶𝑒𝑖     𝑖 ∈ 𝛼
−𝐶𝑒𝑖                                             𝑖 ∉ 𝛼
 
(3) 
Where the expected number of actions, [𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 +
𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2] , is comprised of 𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 ad actions by 
exclusive subscribers, and 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2  actions by 
multihomers, who use only the platform’s core 
service, regardless of 𝑒𝑖. 
3.5 Timeline 
Summarizing, the timeline of the model is as follows: 
1. Platforms make expansion decisions 𝑒1 and 
𝑒2. 
2. The final buyer partition 𝐵𝑒1𝑒2  is determined 
(𝐵𝑒1𝑒2  is the buyer equilibrium). 
3. Platforms set prices per user action 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. 
4. Advertisers choose the platform(s) on which 
they place their ads, 𝛼, and this determines 
platform profits. 
3.6 Market Equilibrium 
We define market equilibrium for the simultaneous 
move expansion game, which represents an 
environment where platforms’ development efforts 
are kept secret until new services are launched. 
Definition 2: Market equilibrium is a couple 
⟨𝛼∗,  (𝑒𝑖
∗, 𝑝𝑖
∗)𝑖=1,2⟩, such that: 
1. Advertisers’ platform choice is optimal, given 
platforms’ expansion and pricing decisions, 
and the resulting 𝐵𝑒1𝑒2 :   𝛼∗ =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼∈𝐴{𝑉(𝛼|(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖)𝑖=1,2, 𝐵
𝑒1𝑒2)}. 
2. Platform pricing is Nash equilibrium, given 
their expansion decisions, 𝐵𝑒1𝑒2 , and 𝛼∗: 𝑝𝑖
∗ =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜋𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2(𝑝𝑖|𝑝𝑗
∗). Subgame equilibrium 
profits: Π𝑖(𝑒1, 𝑒2) ≡ 𝜋𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2(𝑝𝑖
∗|𝑝𝑗
∗). 
3. Platforms’ expansion decisions are Nash 
equilibrium in the expansion game: 𝑒𝑖
∗ =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥Π𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗
∗). 
 
30  This is in the spirit of the “principle of incremental 
pricing” (defined in Anderson et al., 2011).  
The sequential move version of the platform 
expansion game is also considered, as it represents a 
market where platforms’ development efforts are 
known. The sequential version is further used as a 
means of equilibrium selection, whenever multiple 
equilibria arise in the simultaneous move game.  
The definition of market equilibrium for the sequential 
game will be similar, differing only in the equilibrium 
concept for optimal expansion decisions (Item 3 of 
Definition 2), which will be subgame perfect 
equilibrium.  
4 Analysis 
The expansion game is solved by backward induction. 
For each pair of expansion decisions (Timeline Step 
1), the buyer partition is derived (Step 2), and platform 
pricing and profits follow, as platforms set profit 
maximizing prices (Step 3) based on their expected 
impact on advertisers’ choice and the resulting profits 
(Step 4). Comparing profits in each subgame (𝑒1, 𝑒2), 
platforms’ optimal expansion decisions are then 
determined. We begin by deriving platform pricing 
and profits for a given expansion subgame and its 
buyer equilibrium 𝐵𝑒1𝑒2 . 
4.1 Pricing Equilibrium 
In this subsection, we show that equilibrium prices 
and profits are constrained by the degree of user 
multihoming in the final partition. The intuition for 
this result is as follows. First, the profit-maximizing 
price per action induces multihoming by advertisers 
(i.e., placing ads on both platforms). Multihoming 
advertisers suffer partial redundancy from reaching 
multihoming users through both platforms (as 𝑉12 <
𝑉1 + 𝑉2 ). In equilibrium, platforms internalize this 
redundancy by setting prices according to the 
incremental benefit of advertising on an additional 
platform.30 Since this redundancy is a function of the 
mass of multihoming users, 𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 , equilibrium prices 
decrease in 𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 , and increase in the mass of 
exclusive users, 𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 .  
Market power in the model thus stems from the degree 
of exclusivity and decreases in the degree of 
multihoming. 
The following Proposition 1 provides a 
characterization of the pricing equilibrium and the 
resulting platform profits in a given subgame.  
Proposition 1: Given (𝑒1, 𝑒2) and the resulting 𝐵
𝑒1𝑒2 , 
platform 𝑖 sets its price at 𝑝𝑖
∗, where: 
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𝑝𝑖
∗ = 1 −
𝜌2𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2
𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2
 (4) 
 
And its profits are given by: 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 = 𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 + 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 − 𝐶𝑒𝑖 (5) 
 
Equilibrium prices decrease in the degree of 
multihoming, 𝑏12
𝑒1𝑒2 , and increase in their degree of 
exclusivity, 𝑏𝑖
𝑒1𝑒2 . 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
As noted, for a given pair of expansion decisions and 
resulting buyer subscription choices, Proposition 1 
provides the profit maximizing price and subgame 
profits. This interim result will play an important role 
in developing intuition for platform expansion 
decisions, which will also incorporate changes in 
buyers’ platform choices following expansion. 
4.2 Optimal Expansion Rule and 
Intuitions  
Equilibrium profits increase in both exclusivity and 
multihoming, 31  yet expansion may have opposing 
effects on the masses of these groups. We thus 
proceed to derive an optimal expansion rule based on 
the expected profits in each subgame (given by Eq. 
(5)), which we then use in the derivation of expansion 
equilibria, for different parameter spaces. 
We first introduce notation for expansion effects on 
the buyer partition that will be useful down the road. 
Let Δ𝑏𝑘
𝑒𝑖|𝑒𝑗 ≡ 𝑏𝑘
𝐸𝑒𝑗 − 𝑏𝑘
?̅?𝑒𝑗
, for 𝑘 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑗, 12} , denote 
the change in the mass of group 𝑘, resulting from 𝑖’s 
expansion, given the opponent’s strategy 𝑒𝑗 ∈ {?̅?, 𝐸}. 
Our symmetry assumption implies that Δ𝑏𝑘
𝑒𝑖|?̅? =
Δ𝑏𝑘
𝑒𝑗|?̅? and Δ𝑏𝑘
𝑒𝑖|𝐸 = Δ𝑏𝑘
𝑒𝑗|𝐸. 
The optimal expansion rule (henceforth, OER) for 
platform 𝑖 , given 𝑒𝑗 , is derived by solving 𝜋𝑖
𝐸𝑒𝑗 ≥
𝜋𝑖
?̅?𝑒𝑗  (using Eq. (5)), and employing the above 
notation for expansion effects. This yields the 
following condition:  
OER:  𝑒𝑖|𝑒𝑗 = 𝐸 ⇔   𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏𝑖
?̅?𝑒𝑗 + 𝜌(2 −
𝜌)Δ𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝑒𝑗 + 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)Δ𝑏12
𝑒𝑖 |𝑒𝑗 − 𝑐 ≥ 0  
   (6) 
 
31  While multihomers are less profitable than exclusive 
subscribers, they are clearly more profitable than exclusive 
subscribers of the rival platform. 
The OER represents the three effects of expansion: the 
ad-engagement effect and the quantity and price 
effects associated with changes in the user partition. 
Platform expansion decisions are thus based on 
weighing these effects against each other, and against 
the fixed cost of expansion, 𝑐. Further discussion and 
insight into these effects is given as follows:   
The ad-engagement effect. The ad-engagement 
effect refers to the increase in exclusive users’ 
engagement (or ad action) probability, brought on by 
expansion. Specifically, expansion increases these 
users’ engagement probability from  𝜌 to (2𝜌 − 𝜌2), 
an increase of 𝜌(1 − 𝜌) in engagement probability for 
the mass of  𝑏
𝑖
?̅?𝑒𝑗
  of preexpansion exclusive users. 
The ad-engagement effect is thus represented by the 
first term in the OER and is a positive effect aiming 
toward platform expansion. It follows that when the 
user partition does not change as a result of expansion, 
platforms will expand whenever the fixed cost 𝑐 does 
not exceed the ad-engagement effect and the 
equilibrium is (𝐸, 𝐸) . Finally, note that the ad-
engagement effect is non-monotonic in 𝜌, increasing 
in magnitude as 𝜌  increases for 𝜌 < 0.5 , then 
decreasing in 𝜌 for 𝜌 > 0.5. 
The quantity and price effects. The quantity effect is 
the direct effect of platform expansion—the change in 
user partition, which is endogenous in our setting. As 
expansion changes the mass of exclusive and 
multihoming users, it changes the expected number of 
ad actions sold by the platform. The price effect of 
expansion is the indirect effect of the change in user 
partition, as changes in multihoming and exclusivity 
affect prices (see Proposition 1). The quantity and 
price effects are jointly represented in the second and 
third term in the OER. 
It is important to note that changes in the mass of 
multihomers exert opposing quantity and price 
effects. Namely, an increase (decrease) in 
multihoming entails a positive (negative) quantity 
effect, as the platform provides access to more (less) 
multihomers. At the same time, increased (decreased) 
multihoming leads to lower (higher) prices, implying 
a negative (positive) price effect. 
Furthermore, our covered market assumption implies 
that changes in one group’s mass will always be 
accompanied by corresponding changes to one or both 
of the other two user groups. Therefore, the overall 
quantity and price effects of expansion will take 
changes in both exclusivity and multihoming into 
account. 
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4.3 Deriving Optimal Expansion 
Strategies 
We now compare subgame profits to derive platform 
expansion strategies using the OER. This will require 
consideration of different parameter spaces and the 
resulting buyer partitions for each subgame.  
We solve for expansion strategies separately for the 
case of 𝑐 = 0  and for 𝑐 > 0 . In reality, investment 
costs related to expansion are clearly positive and 
affect expansion decisions. Yet, the case of 𝑐 = 0 is 
instructive, as it will allow us to highlight the effects 
on platform expansion strategies of user partition 
endogeneity, intraplatform service quality and 
complementarity, and users’ switching costs and 
response rates to ads. 
Optimal expansion strategies will be summarized in 
Lemmas 1-2. Without loss of generality, assume that 
when 𝑛 = 1, Platform 1 expands, and the subgame is 
(𝐸, ?̅?) (the subgame (?̅?, 𝐸) is symmetric). For brevity, 
subscripts and superscripts are omitted whenever this 
does not create any ambiguity. 
Baseline: Buyer partition with no expansion, 𝒏 = 𝟎. 
𝐵?̅??̅?  is both the initial partition, as well as a possible 
final partition. To derive 𝐵?̅??̅? , we note that user 𝑏 will 
multihome if 𝑢12 ≥ 𝑢𝑖 , and thus whenever 𝑚 ≤ 𝑞 . 
Since 𝑚~𝑈[0,1] , group masses in the initial user 
partition are given by 𝑏12
?̅??̅? = 𝑞  and 𝑏1
?̅??̅? = 𝑏2
?̅??̅? =
0.5(1 − 𝑞) (as platforms are assumed to be 
symmetric), and profits are 𝜋𝑖
?̅??̅? = 0.5𝜌(1 − 𝑞) +
𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑞 = 0.5𝜌 + 𝑞[0.5𝜌 − 𝜌2]. For the remainder 
of the analysis, we assume that 𝑞 < 1, such that all 
groups have positive mass in the initial partition. 
4.3.1 Expansion Strategy When Rival 
Does Not Expand, 𝒆𝒊|?̅?.  
To derive platform 𝑖’s expansion strategy, we find its 
impact on the buyer partition. Without loss of 
generality, let 𝑒1 = 𝐸, 𝑒2 = ?̅? . We consider both 
(weak) increases and decreases in the compatibility 
costs Δ𝑚1 ≥ 0 and Δ𝑚1 < 0.32 Also recall that user 
switching away from the initial platform choice entails 
a switching costs of 𝑠 ≥ 0. 
The discussion in this and the following subsection 
will provide intuitions on user switching in each 
subgame, and its impact on expansion strategies. 
Detailed analysis, with full mathematical derivations 
of users’ decision lines and switching conditions is 
relegated to Appendix B. 
(a) Compatibility costs increase (weakly), 𝚫𝐦𝟏 ≥ 𝟎.  
When Platform 1 expands and compatibility costs 
increase (weakly), Δ𝑚1 ≥ 0, the utility from choosing 
Platform 1 increases, while the utility from 
multihoming decreases (weakly). This implies that 
initial multihomers and Platform 2 users may switch to 
Platform 1. Those who multihome in the initial 
partition (for whom 𝑚 ≤ 𝑞 ) will switch when the 
utility from choosing the expanded Platform 1 is higher 
than that of multihoming, i.e., 𝑢1 > 𝑢12 ⇔ 𝜇 > (𝑞 −
Δ𝑞 − Δ𝑚1 + 𝑠) − 𝑚 . We refer to 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 −
Δ𝑚1 + 𝑠) − 𝑚 as multihomers’ decision line, denoted 
by 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. User switching when only one platform expands, and compatibility costs increase (weakly) with 
expansion, i.e., for (𝑬, ?̅?) and 𝚫𝒎𝟏 ≥ 𝟎. The case of intermediate switching costs, 𝒔 ∈ (𝚫𝒒, ?̅? + 𝚫𝒒), is 
depicted (such that both decision lines are in effect). 
 
32 The cases of Δ𝑚𝑛 > 0 and Δ𝑚𝑛 = 0 (for 𝑛 ∈ {1,2}) are 
qualitatively similar, while the former is more general. The 
analysis of these cases differs qualitatively from the case of 
Δ𝑚𝑛 < 0, which is thus separately analyzed in both this and 
the following subsection (4.3.2).  
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Platform 2 users in the initial partition (for whom 𝑚 >
𝑞) will switch when 𝑢1 > 𝑢2 ⇔ 𝜇 > 𝑠 − Δ𝑞. We refer 
to 𝜇 = 𝑠 − Δ𝑞  as the singlehomers’ decision line, 
denoted by 𝐷𝐿2  in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 
summarizes users’ switching for (𝐸, ?̅?) and Δ𝑚1 ≥ 0. 
Note that the decision lines’ locations, and whether or 
not they are binding, depend on parameter values. 
Figure 1 depicts the case with positive switching by 
both multi- and singlehomers, with some users from 
both groups remaining at their initial subscription 
choice. This is the case for intermediate levels of users’ 
switching cost, namely 𝑠 ∈ (Δ𝑞, ?̅? + Δ𝑞) . See 
Appendix C for a full characterization of parameter 
ranges for decision lines’ possible locations (for Figure 
1, and similarly for the subsequent Figures 2-4). 
Figure 1 demonstrates that when compatibility costs 
(weakly) increase with expansion, there is nonnegative 
switching to Platform 1, depicted by the areas above 
both decision lines. This switching comes from both 
initial multihomers and subscribers of the rival 
platform. For all parameter values,33 subscription to 
the expanded platform will (weakly) increase, whereas 
multihoming and singlehoming with the nonexpanded 
platform will weakly decrease.  
As a result, expansion is a dominant strategy when 
expansion costs are sufficiently low, and the OER 
allows us to derive conditions on parameter ranges that 
support expansion (see Appendix B). The effect of 
expansion costs is analyzed in the Appendix, where we 
find lower and upper bounds 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑐𝐻, such that for 
𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐿 expansion is always a dominant strategy and for 
𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 it is never a dominant strategy. When costs are 
midrange, expansion will depend on the relative 
magnitudes of (𝑐, 𝑠, 𝜌, 𝑞, Δ𝑞, Δ𝑚1 , ?̅? ), that shift the 
LHS of the OER.34 
(b) Compatibility costs decrease, 𝚫𝐦𝟏 < 𝟎.  
When Platform 1’s expansion decreases compatibility 
costs, Δ𝑚1 < 0, both the utility from Platform 1 as 
well as the utility from multihoming increase. Users 
may thus switch to either multihoming or to the 
expanded Platform 1. 
Users who multihome in the initial partition (for whom 
𝑚 ≤ 𝑞) will switch to Platform 1 when this choice 
provides higher utility, 𝑢1 > 𝑢12.  This defines 
multihomers’ decision line, 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| +
𝑠) − 𝑚, denoted by 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  in Figure 2 below, where 
users above the line switch to the expanded platform.35 
Platform 2 users (for whom 𝑚 > 𝑞 ) may switch to 
either Platform 1 or multihoming. Their switching 
decisions are derived by comparing utilities from each 
choice, yielding decision lines 𝐷𝐿2𝑎, 𝐷𝐿2𝑏 and 𝐷𝐿2𝑐: 
𝜇 = 𝑠 − Δ𝑞, 𝑚 = 𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| − 𝑠, and 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 +
|Δ𝑚1|) − 𝑚 ), respectively. These are graphed in 
Figure 2, which summarizes switching for (𝐸, ?̅?) and 
Δ𝑚1 < 0. Again, the decision lines’ location depends 
on parameter values and we depict the case where all 
decision lines are in effect, namely 𝑠 ∈ (Δ𝑞, ?̅? + Δ𝑞 −
|Δ𝑚1|) ⋂(|Δ𝑚1| − (1 − 𝑞), |Δ𝑚1|)  and |Δ𝑚1| > Δ𝑞 
(see Appendix C for a characterization of other cases). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. User switching when only one platform expands, and compatibility costs decrease with expansion, 
i.e., for (𝑬, ?̅?) and 𝚫𝒎𝟏 < 𝟎. The case of 𝒔 ∈ (𝚫𝒒, ?̅? + 𝚫𝒒 − |𝚫𝒎𝟏|)⋂(|𝚫𝒎𝟏| − (𝟏 − 𝒒), |𝚫𝒎𝟏|) and 
|𝚫𝒎𝟏| > 𝚫𝒒, is depicted (such that all decision lines are in effect).  
 
33 Including those not represented in Figure 1. 
34 A discussion of comparative statics for all parameters is 
provided in section 4.4. 
35 As noted, full derivations are provided in the Appendix. 
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As in scenario (a) above, there is nonnegative 
switching to Platform 1, which is depicted by the areas 
above the decision lines in Figure 2. Since users may 
only switch away from the nonexpanded platform, the 
mass of its subscribers will (weakly) decrease, whereas 
the mass of multihomers may either increase or 
decrease, depending on the relative magnitudes of the 
area above 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  and the area below 𝐷𝐿2𝑐. Intuitively, 
increases in multihoming are only due to users who 
were initially singlehomers with the nonexpanded 
platform, and expansion is thus the optimal strategy for 
both increases and decreases in multihoming.  
Formally, the OER inequality holds for 𝑐 = 0 , and 
expansion is a dominant strategy when its cost is 
sufficiently low. See Appendix B for a detailed 
analysis, which includes the impact of expansion costs 
on the optimal expansion strategy. Lemma 1 
summarizes the conditions for optimal expansion when 
the rival has not expanded. 
Lemma 1: Expansion strategy given 𝒆𝒋 = ?̅?. When 
𝑒𝑗 = ?̅?, and for 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑐𝐿|?̅? and 𝑐𝐻 = 𝑐𝐻|?̅? : 
1. When 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐿 , expansion is a dominant strategy 
for all parameter values: 𝑒1|?̅? ≡ 𝐸.  
2. When 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 , expansion is a dominated 
strategy for all parameter values: 𝑒1|?̅? ≡ ?̅?. 
3. When 𝑐 ∈ (𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐𝐻]: both 𝑒1|?̅? = 𝐸 and 𝑒1|?̅? =
?̅? are possible, and depend on the relative 
magnitudes of all parameters 
(𝑐, 𝑠, 𝜌, 𝑞, Δ𝑞, |Δ𝑚1|, ?̅?).  
Proof: Follows from the above analysis of scenarios 
(a) and (b) and further derivations given in 
Appendix B).  
4.3.2 Expansion Strategy When Rival 
Expands, 𝐞𝐢|𝐄.  
We continue to derive 𝑖 ’s expansion strategy by 
studying its impact on the buyer partition, considering 
both (weak) increases and decreases in the 
compatibility costs as a result of expansion. As before, 
detailed derivations and analysis of the impact of 
positive expansion costs are relegated to Appendix B. 
(a) Compatibility costs increase (weakly), 𝚫𝐦𝟐 ≥ 𝟎.  
Given that Platform 2 has expanded, expansion by 
Platform 1 that (weakly) increases compatibility costs 
(Δ𝑚2 ≥ 0), will (weakly) decrease the utility from 
multihoming, while increasing the utility from a choice 
of Platform 1 to the same level of utility derived from 
its expanded rival.  
As a result, some initial multihomers will become 
exclusive users of either Platform 1 or 2, with equal 
probability (due to symmetry). Comparing utilities 
from single- and multihoming yields multihomers’ 
decision line, 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + 𝑠 − Δ𝑚2) − 𝑚, denoted 
by 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  in Figure 3 below. There is no decision line 
for exclusive subscribers of Platforms 1 and 2, as they 
will optimally refrain from any switching in this 
subgame. 
Switching decisions are summarized in Figure 3, 
which depicts the case where the decision line is in 
effect, i.e., 𝑠 ∈ (Δ𝑚2 − (𝑞 − Δ𝑞), ?̅? + Δ𝑞 + Δ𝑚2) 
(see Appendix C for a characterization of other cases). 
As seen in Figure 3, there is nonnegative switching by 
multihomers to the expanded platforms (depicted by 
the area above multihomers’ decision line). As a result, 
expansion is a dominant strategy when expansion costs 
are sufficiently low (see Appendix B for an analysis of 
the impact of expansion costs). 
 
 
Figure 3. : User switching when both platforms expand and compatibility costs weakly increase with 
expansion, i.e., for (𝑬, 𝑬) and 𝚫𝒎𝟐 ≥ 𝟎. The case of 𝒔 ∈ (𝚫𝒎𝟐 − (𝒒 − 𝚫𝒒), ?̅? + 𝚫𝒒 + 𝚫𝒎𝟐) is depicted 
(decision line is in effect). 
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(b) Compatibility costs decrease, 𝚫𝐦𝟐 < 𝟎. 
Given that Platform 2 has expanded, expansion by 
Platform 1 that decreases compatibility costs (Δ𝑚2 <
0) will increase the utility from multihoming while 
also increasing the utility from a choice of Platform 1 
to the same level of utility derived from its expanded 
rival. In this case, multihomers will switch to Platform 
1 or 2 (with equal probability) when the utility from 
singlehoming is higher, which defines multihomers’ 
decision line, 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻 , given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 +
|Δ𝑚2| + 𝑠) − 𝑚, and graphed in Figure 4 below. 
At the same time, some exclusive users of Platforms 1 
and 2 may switch to multihoming. Switching to 
multihoming is utility maximizing for (𝑚, 𝜇) 
combinations below the 𝐷𝐿1,2  decision line ( 𝜇 =
(𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚2| − 𝑠) − 𝑚 ) in Figure 4. Figure 4 
summarizes users’ switching, depicting the case where 
both decision lines are in effect, i.e., 𝑠 < min{?̅? −
(|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞), |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞}  (see Appendix  C for a 
characterization of other cases). 
The optimal expansion strategy will now depend on the 
relative switching to multihoming and to the expanded 
platforms, represented by the areas of the triangles in 
Figure 4. These, in turn, depend on the relative 
magnitudes of the changes in compatibility costs, 
incremental quality of the newly added service, 
intraplatform service complementarity, and switching 
costs. We distinguish between two cases (b1) and (b2), 
based on the relative magnitudes of these parameters, 
namely |Δ𝑚2|, Δ𝑞, ?̅? and 𝑠.  
Case (b1): When the utility increase from 
multihoming is smaller than the average utility 
increase from singlehoming (i.e., |Δ𝑚2| ≤ Δ𝑞 +
0.5?̅? ), more multihomers switch to the expanded 
platforms than vice versa, and expansion is a dominant 
strategy when its cost is low. 
Case (b2): When the utility increase from 
multihoming is higher than the average utility increase 
from singlehoming (i.e., |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅? ), more 
singlehomers switch to multihoming than vice versa. 
Now, expansion is no longer a dominant strategy, and 
no-expansion may be optimal, even when expansion is 
costless (see Appendix B for detailed derivations of 
subcases (b1) and (b2), and the impact of expansion 
costs). Lemma 2 summarizes the conditions for 
optimal expansion given that the rival has expanded. 
Lemma 2: Expansion strategy given 𝒆𝒋 = 𝑬. When 
𝑒𝑗 = 𝐸, there are two scenarios: 
1. For Δ𝑚2 > 0  and for (Δ𝑚2 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |Δ𝑚2| ≤
Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?)  there exist 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑐𝐿|𝐸  and  𝑐𝐻 ∈
{𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0, 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1)} such that  
a. When 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐿 , expansion is a dominant 
strategy for all parameter values: 𝑒𝑖|𝐸 ≡ 𝐸.  
b. When 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 , expansion is a dominated 
strategy for all parameter values: 𝑒𝑖|𝐸 ≡ ?̅?. 
c. When 𝑐 ∈ (𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐𝐻]: both 𝑒𝑖|𝐸 = 𝐸 and 
𝑒𝑖|𝐸 = ?̅? are possible, and depend on the 
relative magnitudes of all parameters 
(𝑐, 𝑠, 𝜌, 𝑞, Δ𝑞, Δ𝑚2, ?̅?). 
 
 
Figure 4. User switching when both platforms expand and compatibility costs weakly increase with 
expansion, i.e., for (𝑬, 𝑬) and 𝚫𝒎𝟐 ≥ 𝟎. The case of 𝒔 ∈ (𝚫𝒎𝟐 − (𝒒 − 𝚫𝒒), ?̅? + 𝚫𝒒 + 𝚫𝒎𝟐) is depicted 
(decision line is in effect). 
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2.     For (Δ𝑚2 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?) , 
expansion is never a dominant strategy. There 
exists 𝑐𝐻 = 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏2), such that:  
a. When 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐻 , 𝑒𝑖|𝐸 = 𝐸 if and only if 𝑐 +
 𝜌2|Δ𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝐸| ≤ 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸. 
b. When 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 , expansion is a dominated 
strategy for all parameter values: 𝑒𝑖|𝐸 ≡ ?̅?. 
Proof: Follows from the above analysis and from 
derivations in Appendix B.  
4.4 Expansion Equilibrium and 
Comparative Statics 
The results of Lemmas 1 and 2 are summarized in the 
following Corollary 1. 
Corollary 1: Optimal expansion strategies.  
1. When expansion weakly increases the mass of 
exclusive subscribers of the expanding 
platform, there exist 𝑐𝐻 ≥ 𝑐𝐿 ≥ 0 , such that 
expansion is a dominant strategy for 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐿, a 
dominated strategy for 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 , and a possible 
optimal strategy for 𝑐 ∈ (𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐𝐻] , where the 
latter depends on the relative magnitudes of 
(𝑐, 𝑠, 𝜌, 𝑞, 𝛥𝑞, 𝛥𝑚1,𝛥𝑚2, ?̅?). 
2. When expansion decreases the mass of 
exclusive subscribers of the expanding 
platform, there exist 𝑐𝐻 > 0 , such that 
expansion is a dominated strategy for 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 
and a possible optimal strategy for 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐻 . 
Specifically, for 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐻 , when 𝛥𝑚
2 < 0 , 
|𝛥𝑚2| > 𝛥𝑞 + 0.5?̅? , 𝑒𝑖|𝐸 = 𝐸  if and only if 
𝑐 + 𝜌2|𝛥𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝐸| ≤ 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸. 
The main effects discussed in Section 4.2 drive the 
result in Corollary 1, for the case of costless expansion 
or low expansion costs. When the cost of expansion is 
sufficiently low, expansion is a dominant strategy 
whenever it increases exclusivity and decreases 
multihoming—that is, when the price effect is positive, 
and expansion increases market power. On the other 
hand, when expansion decreases exclusivity and the 
price effect is negative, expansion is no longer a 
dominant strategy; rather, it depends on the relative 
magnitudes of the price, quantity and ad-engagement 
effects. 
When the cost of expansion increases, it becomes a 
major force in the model, preventing expansion when 
it is high. For intermediate values of the expansion 
cost, the optimal expansion strategy will depend on the 
relative magnitudes of the expansion cost and the 
quantity, price and ad-engagement effects. As seen 
above, the quantity effect is created by users’ 
switching decisions, which depend on the relative 
benefits of intraplatform service quality and 
complementarity, and the costs of compatibility and 
switching. 
The resulting expansion equilibrium is stated in 
Proposition 2, which considers the equilibrium for low, 
high, and intermediate expansion costs. 
Proposition 2: Expansion equilibrium.  
1. Low expansion cost. There exists 𝑐𝐿  such that 
for 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐿: 
a. For Δ𝑚2 ≥ 0 and for (Δ𝑚2 <
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |Δ𝑚2| ≤ 0.5?̅? + Δ𝑞), the expansion 
equilibrium is (𝐸, 𝐸).  
b. For Δ𝑚2 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |Δ𝑚2| > 0.5?̅? + Δ𝑞, the 
expansion equilibrium is asymmetric, i.e., 
both (𝐸, ?̅?) and (?̅?, 𝐸) are equilibria, if 𝜌2 ⋅
|Δ𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝐸| + 𝑐 > 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸, and otherwise 
the equilibrium is (𝐸, 𝐸). 
2. High expansion cost. There exists 𝑐𝐻  such that 
for 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 the equilibrium is (?̅?, ?̅?). 
3. Intermediate expansion cost. There exist 𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐𝐻 , 
such that for 𝑐 ∈ (𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐𝐻), all equilibrium types 
are possible (symmetric expansion, no-
expansion, and asymmetric expansion) and the 
expansion equilibrium will depend on the 
parameters’ relative magnitudes. 
Proof:  
    1.  Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2  
for 𝑐𝐿 = min{𝑐𝐿|?̅? , 𝑐𝐿|𝐸}. 
 
               2. Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 for 𝑐𝐻 = max 
{𝑐𝐻|?̅? , 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0, 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1), 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏2)} 
 
    3. Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2  
for 𝑐𝐿 = max  {𝑐𝐿|?̅? , 𝑐𝐿|𝐸} and 𝑐𝐻 = min 
{𝑐𝐻|?̅? , 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0, 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1), 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏2)} 
The equilibrium is derived for specific parameter 
values by applying the OER.  
Note that whenever the equilibrium in the 
simultaneous expansion game is asymmetric (i.e., both 
(𝐸, ?̅?)  and (?̅?, 𝐸)  are equilibria), then in the 
sequential-move game, the first mover will expand and 
the follower will not. Clearly, the expanded platform 
enjoys higher profits than its nonexpanded rival, and 
the sequential expansion game is thus characterized by 
a first mover advantage. 
Proposition 2 (Parts 1-3) does not cover all possible 
ranges of 𝑐 , as we do not explicitly write the 
equilibrium for: 
 𝑐𝐿 ∈ (min{𝑐𝐿|?̅? , 𝑐𝐿|𝐸} ,max{𝑐𝐿|?̅? , 𝑐𝐿|𝐸})  and 𝑐𝐻 ∈
(min{𝑐𝐻|?̅? , 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0, 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1), 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏2)} ,
max{𝑐𝐻|?̅? , 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0, 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1), 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏2)}).
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This is to avoid repetition, as the derivation proceeds 
similarly, following from Lemmas 1 and 2. 
The main take-away from the derivations presented is 
that even when expansion costs are low, expansion 
may not necessarily be an optimal strategy, as changes 
in the buyer partition resulting from expansion affect 
the pricing equilibrium and thus platforms’ expansion 
strategy. Interestingly, the equilibrium may be 
asymmetric even for symmetric platforms. Clearly, as 
the expansion cost increases, so does its impact on the 
equilibrium strategies.   
Generally, for any combination of parameter values, 
the OER is used to derive the optimal expansion 
strategies and resulting equilibrium. We thus consider 
how the OER changes with each of the parameters. 
These comparative statics highlight the different forces 
at work in our model, all of which should be considered 
by platforms as they decide whether or not to expand 
into a service offered by a rival platform. The effects 
of changes in each parameter, while all others are held 
constant, are analyzed in Proposition 3 below. 
Proposition 3: Comparative statics. For 𝑐 that does 
not exceed the upper bounds derived, the optimal 
expansion strategy may change from expansion to no-
expansion as a result of the following changes in 
parameters: 
1. Increases in 𝑐. 
2. Increases in 𝑠 and 𝑞, when expansion increases 
exclusivity. 
3. Decreases in 𝜌, when 𝜌 < 0.5. 
4. Decreases in Δ𝑞 and ?̅?. 
5. Decreases in Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2, when Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 > 0, 
and increases in |Δ𝑚1|, |Δ𝑚2| when 
Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 < 0. 
Proof: We consider the effect of each parameter, 
holding all others constant. 
The effect of 𝑐: Increases in 𝑐 shift the OER downward 
and may change the optimal strategy from 𝐸 to ?̅?. 
The effect of 𝜌:  The ad-engagement effect, i.e., the 
additional ad actions derived from existing users 
following expansion is 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏
𝑖
?̅?𝑒𝑗
, which increases 
in 𝜌  for 𝜌 < 0.5  and decreases in 𝜌  for 𝜌 > 0.5 . 
Increases in 𝜌, thus, shift the OER upward when 𝜌 <
0.5 and otherwise the effect on the OER will depend 
on the remaining parameters’ values. 
The effect of 𝒔: Increases in 𝑠 reduce switching. When 
expansion increases exclusivity, increases in 𝑠 
decrease beneficial switching and will reduce the 
incentive to expand. Conversely, if expansion lowers 
exclusivity and increases multihoming, increases in 𝑠 
make expansion more beneficial, and may thus change 
the optimal expansion strategy from ?̅? to 𝐸. 
The effect of 𝒒: Increases in 𝑞 imply a larger 𝑢12 −
𝑢𝑖 , and thus lower the incentive to expand when 
expansion increases exclusivity. However, when 
expansion decreases exclusivity, expansion can 
counter the impact of increases in 𝑞 . Therefore, for 
Δ𝑚2 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞 > 0.5?̅? , increases in 𝑞 
may result in a switch from optimal no-expansion to 
expansion, and otherwise the reverse is possible. 
The effect of 𝚫𝒒, ?̅?: Increases in Δ𝑞, ?̅? lead to a higher 
utility from singlehoming on an expanded platform 
and increase the benefit of expansion. Furthermore, 
increases in these parameters reduce the domain in 
which expansion decreases exclusivity (for Δ𝑚2 <
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞 > 0.5?̅? ). Therefore, increases in 
Δ𝑞  and ?̅?  will make expansion more likely, and 
decreases in Δ𝑞 and ?̅?  may result in a switch from 
optimal expansion to no-expansion. 
The effect of 𝚫𝒎𝟏, 𝚫𝒎𝟐 : For Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 >
0, increases in these parameters reduce the utility from 
multihoming and increase singlehoming and the 
benefits of expansion. For Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 < 0, decreases 
in |Δ𝑚1|, |Δ𝑚2| reduce the utility from multihoming 
and increase the benefits of expansion. Moreover, for 
Δ𝑚2 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞 > 0.5?̅? , decreases in 
|Δ𝑚2|  reduce the domain in which expansion 
decreases exclusivity. This implies that increases in 
Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 lead to more expansion when Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 >
0  and decreases in |Δ𝑚1|, |Δ𝑚2|  lead to more 
expansion when Δ𝑚1, Δ𝑚2 < 0.  
4.5 A Potential Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In this section, we highlight a noteworthy equilibrium 
outcome—a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is an 
equilibrium where both platforms optimally choose to 
expand but would have enjoyed higher profits by 
coordinating a “no-expansion” equilibrium. With 
“platform imperialism” prevalent in many digital 
markets, it is important to investigate the potential for 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma in our model and develop 
intuitions for this interesting scenario. 
Thus far, our model has shown that expansion is not 
necessarily an optimal strategy for platforms, and that 
its benefits must be weighed against its costs and a 
potentially negative price effect resulting from more 
direct competition with the rival platform (represented 
by increased multihoming). Now we consider the case 
where expansion is individually rational, yielding a 
symmetric expansion equilibrium, (𝐸, 𝐸), with profits 
that are lower than the no-expansion profits, 𝜋𝐸?̅? >
𝜋𝐸𝐸. When would this be the case? 
Intuitively, when the effect of intensified competition 
is not too strong and expansion costs are not 
prohibitively high, platforms will expand to increase 
the probability of an ad-related action by their 
exclusive subscribers while still benefiting from the 
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baseline level of ad-actions by multihomers (who 
subscribe to core services). Taken together, these 
imply higher profits from the advertisers’ side of the 
market for the expanded platform, given the rival’s 
strategy. This intuition holds even when multihoming 
increases and exclusivity decreases following 
expansion (as long as the price effect is not too strong), 
and this is precisely the case where a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma may arise. Specifically, when multihoming 
increases and exclusivity decreases with expansion, it 
is possible to identify a range of expansion costs for 
which coordinated no-expansion would have resulted 
in higher profits. In this cost range, higher profits under 
no-expansion are due to higher exclusivity with 
reduced price competition, while platforms do not 
incur any expansion costs.  
This outcome is a subcase of the one shown in Case 
(b2) of Figure 4 (in 4.3.2 above). Recall that in this 
Case (b2), expansion results in a utility increase from 
multihoming that is higher than the average utility 
increase from singlehoming (i.e., |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 +
0.5?̅? ). This implies more switching to multihoming 
than to singlehoming when both platforms expands. 
Thus, platforms will expand only when the cost of 
expansion is sufficiently low, namely when 𝑐 ≤
𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 − 𝜌2|Δ𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝐸|. Within the cost range that 
ensures a symmetric expansion equilibrium when the 
expansion cost is sufficiently high, the (𝐸, 𝐸) 
equilibrium constitutes a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This 
result is formally stated in the following proposition.  
Proposition 4: A Prisoner’s Dilemma. The equilibrium 
is a Prisoner’s Dilemma when Δ𝑚2 <
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |Δ𝑚2| > 0.5?̅? + Δ𝑞, and the expansion cost 
is in the following range 𝑐 ∈ (𝜌(1 − 2𝜌)𝑏1
?̅??̅? +
𝜌2𝑏1
𝐸𝐸 , 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 − 𝜌2|Δ𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝐸|]. 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
The above analysis demonstrates the possibility of 
individually rational expansion even when it implies 
lower profits for both platforms. While common in 
strategic interactions, this type of outcome is 
interesting and noteworthy for platforms. 
5 Discussion and Managerial 
Implications 
5.1 Managerial Implications 
We have presented a game-theoretic framework for the 
analysis of online platforms’ expansion decisions 
when the buyer partition is endogenous. Our analysis 
demonstrates that expansion may not be optimal when 
it intensifies competition between the platforms; that 
is, when it decreases the degree of user singlehoming 
and increases multihoming, thus lowering equilibrium 
prices charged to advertisers.  
The model provides an optimal expansion rule that 
takes into account the relative impacts of various 
parameters affecting the costs and benefits of 
expansion, such as expansion cost, same-platform 
service complementarity, users’ switching costs, 
platform compatibility, users’ ad-engagement rates, 
and more. This optimal expansion rule may be used by 
practitioners to help structure decision-making 
regarding expansion into a service already offered by a 
rival platform. 
Deriving conditions for different types of expansion 
equilibria, our analysis demonstrates that the 
expansion equilibrium may be asymmetric, even when 
platforms are symmetric, and that both symmetric 
expansion and no-expansion are possible outcomes. 
The key takeaway for managers is that platforms 
should not always expand into services offered by their 
rivals, and that careful consideration of different 
market characteristics is required when devising 
expansion strategies. 
Moreover, the model highlights the possibility of a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, a notable subcase of a symmetric 
expansion equilibrium, which is individually rational, 
yet characterized by lower profits compared to 
coordinated no-expansion. Managers should, 
therefore, seek to understand the circumstances that 
may give rise to such an inevitably “bad equilibrium,” 
especially when coordination is not possible (e.g., due 
to antitrust laws). 
5.2 Discussion and Extensions  
The possibility of intensified competition following 
platform expansion drives many of our model’s results. 
In our model, such intensified competition is due to 
expansion effects on interplatform compatibility that 
impact the degree of user multihoming and exclusivity. 
Alternatively, one may consider other mechanisms 
driving expansion effects on the user partition (and 
hence, affecting the level of competition in the 
market). Possible examples are choice set effects, or 
changes in users’ perceptions of platform identity and 
service differentiation as a result of expansion, where 
each of these may impact buyers’ decision-making 
processes and subsequent platform choice.  
The model may also be extended to consider 
subscription to services of the same type from both 
platforms, in lieu of the simplifying assumption that 
users subscribe to one service of each type. In such a 
general setting, the level of substitution or 
complementarity between same-type services will 
affect the partition of users and their multihoming 
behavior postexpansion. The model may further 
inform expansion decisions when the market is not 
covered and platforms expand to redefine market 
boundaries and reach untapped user segments. In such 
a variant of the model, new buyers’ platform choices 
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will continue to depend on platforms’ expansion 
decisions and multihoming will increase with 
expansion when compatibility costs decrease.36  The 
covered market assumption may thus be relaxed, and 
our main results will qualitatively hold.37  
Finally, note that in our framework, utility does not 
depend on users’ expectations regarding the number of 
subscribers on each platform, i.e., we abstract from 
modeling the same-side network effect. Leaving buyer 
expectations outside the scope of our model is a choice 
made for two related reasons. First, when utility is a 
function of expectations of other users’ subscription 
decisions, the result is often a winner-take-all 
equilibrium, where all users congregate on the same 
platform (e.g., Calliaud & Jullien, 2003; Zhu & Iansiti, 
2012). Second, due to the potential for obtaining such 
knife-edge equilibria, expectations have already been 
the focus of several papers in the platforms literature 
(e.g., Hagiu & Halaburda, 2011; Halaburda, Jullien, & 
Yehezkel, 2016; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). We have thus 
abstracted away from modeling expectations, in order 
to focus on the other effects of expansion discussed 
above. Future work may consider endogenous user 
expectations and the implied same-side network effect 
within a strategic expansion game. 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
Our general framework is amenable to different market 
settings and may be applied by managers even without 
fully specifying assumptions on buyers’ decision-
making—as the OER may be used based on forecasts 
on the partition of users following expansion. 
Whenever multihoming may increase, caution is 
advised, as expansion may decrease, rather than 
increase, profits. Moreover, in real-world situations, 
the cost of developing new services must be carefully 
weighed against the benefits of new service 
introduction, which may be low with an incumbent 
service already in place. 
Returning to the example of Google Plus: Does the 
model imply that Google should not have expanded 
into social networking? Google Plus did not succeed in 
stealing away (most) Facebook users and it seems that 
any effects on the user partition were minor at best. The 
main benefit of this expansion was generating more ad 
engagement from Google’s existing user base with the 
addition of valuable social network data. Given the 
limited use of Google Plus (compared to Facebook), 
this benefit should be weighed against the cost of 
expansion.   
Expansion effects on the user partition may play a 
more prominent role for the many platforms expanding 
into content streaming services. Video streaming 
services are likely to complement each other and create 
an “increased appetite” for streamed content. 
Therefore, expansion into content streaming may 
increase users’ multihoming with competitors. For 
example, Amazon users who start using Amazon 
Instant Video may also increase their consumption of 
Netflix, Hulu, and other competitors. Expansion into 
content streaming should therefore take such strategic 
effects into account.
.   
 
36 The notion of multihoming will require updating to include 
any subscription to both platforms (not limited to use of each 
platform’s core service). 
37  Note that the analysis of the model will be quite 
cumbersome when this assumption is relaxed. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 138 
Given (𝑒1, 𝑒2) and 𝐵, advertisers place ads on both platforms whenever 𝑉
12 ≥ 𝑉1, 𝑉2, 0, and choose a single platform 
𝑖 whenever 𝑉𝑖 > 𝑉12, 𝑉𝑗, 039. Solving 𝑉12 ≥ 𝑉𝑗  we find that 𝛼∗ = {1,2} whenever 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑖
∗. Furthermore, note that 
𝑉𝑖 ≥ 𝑉𝑗 if and only if 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑖(𝑝𝑗), where 𝑝𝑖(𝑝𝑗) ≡
[𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖−𝜌𝑗𝑏𝑗]+𝑝𝑗[𝜌𝑗𝑏𝑗+𝜌𝑏12]
𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖+𝜌𝑏12
 . It is easily verified that 𝑝𝑖
∗ = 𝑝𝑖(𝑝𝑗
∗), thus 
𝑉1 = 𝑉2 = 𝑉12 = 𝜌2𝑏12 for 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖
∗, 𝑖 = 1,2. 
We show that pricing at 𝑝𝑖
∗ is profit maximizing. First note that 𝑖 ∈ 𝛼∗ for all 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑖
∗, and the profit maximizing price 
in this region is clearly 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖
∗. We now consider 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑝𝑖
∗. Pricing at 𝑝𝑖 > 1 leads to 𝑖 ∉ 𝛼
∗ and zero revenue with 
𝜋𝑖 = −𝐶
𝑒𝑖 ≤ 0, and is not profit maximizing. Therefore assume 𝑝𝑖 ∈ (𝑝𝑖
∗, 1): if 𝑝𝑗 ∈ (𝑝𝑗
∗, 1) and that only one platform 
is chosen by advertisers—assume that 𝑖  is chosen, i.e., 𝑉𝑖 ≥ 𝑉𝑗 . This implies 𝜋𝑗 = −𝐶
𝑒𝑗 ≤ 0 , and a profitable 
deviation to 𝑝𝑗
∗. Alternatively, if 𝑝𝑖 ∈ (𝑝𝑖
∗, 1) and 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗
∗ then 𝑉𝑗 > 𝑉𝑖, thus 𝑖 ∉ 𝛼∗ and 𝑖 has a profitable deviation to 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖
∗. We have thus shown that for any price 𝑝𝑖 ≠ 𝑝𝑖
∗ there exists a profitable deviation to 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖
∗.  Nash equilibrium 
prices in a given subgame are thus 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖
∗ for 𝑖 = 1,2. Substituting for 𝑝𝑖
∗ in Eq. (3) yields the expression in Eq. (5) 
for platforms’ profits in subgame (𝑒1, 𝑒2).  
To see that 𝑝𝑖
∗ decreases in 𝑏12 and increases in 𝑏𝑖 we examine the following first order derivatives: 
(1) 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑏12
= −
𝜌2𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖
(𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖+𝜌𝑏12)
2 < 0 
(2) 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑏𝑖
=
𝜌2𝜌𝑖𝑏12
(𝜌𝑖𝑏𝑖+𝜌𝑏12)
2 > 0 
Proof of Proposition 4 
A Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) would arise when expansion increases multihoming, and therefore 𝑏1
?̅??̅? ≥ 𝑏1
𝐸𝐸 ≥ 𝑏1
?̅?𝐸. This 
is depicted in Figure 4, Case (b2), where the utility increase from multihoming is higher than the average utility increase 
from singlehoming (i.e., |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?), and thus more singlehomers switch to multihoming than vice versa. In 
this case, i.e., for Δ𝑚2 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |Δ𝑚2| > 0.5?̅? + Δ𝑞: the equilibrium is (𝐸, 𝐸) ⇔ 𝑐 ≤ 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 − 𝜌2|Δ𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝐸| (as 
stated in Proposition 2). 
We now derive the condition for a PD, namely 𝜋1
𝐸𝐸 < 𝜋1
?̅??̅?. Using (5), this profit inequality becomes- 
𝜌𝑏1
?̅??̅? + 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏12
?̅??̅? > 𝜌(2 − 𝜌)𝑏1
𝐸𝐸 + 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏12
𝐸𝐸 − 𝑐 
Symmetry implies 𝑏12 = 1 − 2𝑏1 for both (𝐸, 𝐸) and (?̅?, ?̅?), and thus the PD inequality is equivalent to  
𝑐 > 𝜌(1 − 2𝜌)𝑏1
?̅??̅? + 𝜌2𝑏1
𝐸𝐸 
Combining the conditions for (𝐸, 𝐸) and PD, and arranging, we find the range of expansion costs for which a PD will 
arise. Namely, a PD expansion equilibrium is the outcome for  
𝑐 ∈ (𝜌(1 − 2𝜌)𝑏1
?̅??̅? + 𝜌2𝑏1
𝐸𝐸 , 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 − 𝜌2|Δ𝑏𝑖
𝑒𝑖|𝐸|] 
This domain is nonempty whenever 𝜌(1 − 2𝜌)𝑏1
?̅??̅? + 𝜌2𝑏1
𝐸𝐸 <  𝜌𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 − 𝜌2𝑏1
𝐸𝐸, i.e., when the probability of an ad action 
is sufficiently large: 𝜌 >
𝑏1
?̅??̅?−𝑏1
?̅?𝐸
2(𝑏1
?̅??̅?−𝑏1
𝐸𝐸)
.  
 
38 Note: Throughout the proof, the superscript 𝑒1𝑒2 is omitted for brevity. 
39 We assume that indifference between α = {1,2} and α = {i} is resolved in favor of α = {1,2}. 
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Appendix B. Optimal Expansion Strategies: Full Derivations for Section 4.3 
Expansion Strategy When Rival Does Not Expand, 𝒆𝒊|?̅?.  
(a) Compatibility costs increase (weakly), 𝛥𝑚1 ≥ 0.  
Deriving 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  in Figure 1: 
𝑢1 > 𝑢12 ⇔ 𝑞 + Δ𝑞 + 𝜇 − 𝑠 > 2𝑞 − (𝑚 + Δ𝑚
1). This implies 𝜇 > (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 − Δ𝑚1 + 𝑠) − 𝑚. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is 
given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 − Δ𝑚1 + 𝑠) − 𝑚. 
Deriving 𝐷𝐿2:  
𝑢1 > 𝑢2 ⇔ 𝑞 + Δ𝑞 + 𝜇 − 𝑠 > 𝑞. This implies 𝜇 > 𝑠 − Δ𝑞. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿2 is given by 𝜇 = 𝑠 − Δ𝑞.  
Deriving Expansion Strategies: 
For all parameter values, Δ𝑏12 ≤ 0, Δ𝑏1 ≥ 0, Δ𝑏2 ≤ 0 and Δ𝑏1 = |Δ𝑏12| + |Δ𝑏2|. Substituting into the OER we have 
𝑒1|?̅? = 𝐸 ⇔   𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅??̅? + 𝜌(2 − 𝜌)[|Δ𝑏12| + |Δ𝑏2|] − 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)|Δ𝑏12| − 𝑐 ≥ 0. 
Simplifying, the inequality becomes 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅??̅? + 𝜌(2 − 𝜌)|Δ𝑏2| + 𝜌|Δ𝑏12| − 𝑐 ≥ 0, which always holds when 
𝑐 = 0. 
To analyze the effect of 𝑐 > 0, we find lower and upper bounds 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑐𝐻 such that for 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐿 expansion is always a 
dominant strategy and for 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻 it is never a dominant strategy. These bounds will vary by subgame and by the effect 
of expansion on the compatibility cost, and we thus use the full notation 𝑐𝐿|𝑒𝑗,Δ𝑚𝑛 , 𝑐𝐻|𝑒𝑗,Δ𝑚𝑛  to summarize and compare 
different cases. The lower bound, 𝑐𝐿, supports expansion when the incremental profits are minimal, i.e., only the ad-
engagement effect drives expansion: Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 = Δ𝑏12 = 0 . Employing the OER yields 𝑒1|?̅? = 𝐸 ⇔ 𝜌(1 −
𝜌)𝑏1
?̅??̅? − 𝑐 ≥ 0 ⇒  𝑐𝐿|?̅?,Δ𝑚1>0 = 0.5𝜌(1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝑞). 
The upper bound 𝑐𝐻  represents prohibitive costs such that expansion is never optimal, even when the increase in 
exclusivity and decrease in multihoming are maximal, i.e., 𝑏1
𝐸?̅? = 1, 𝑏2
𝐸?̅? = 0 and 𝑏12
𝐸?̅? = 0. Solving 𝜋1
𝐸?̅? < 𝜋1
?̅??̅? ⇔
𝜌(2 − 𝜌) ⋅ 1 − 𝑐 < 0.5𝜌 + 𝑞[0.5𝜌 − 𝜌2] we find 𝑐𝐻|?̅?,Δ𝑚1>0 = 𝜌(0.5 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝑞) + 𝜌. 
When costs are midrange, 𝑐 ∈ (𝑐𝐿|?̅?,Δ𝑚1>0, 𝑐𝐻|?̅?,Δ𝑚1>0] , expansion will depend on the relative magnitudes of 
(𝑐, 𝑠, 𝜌, 𝑞, Δ𝑞, Δ𝑚1, ?̅?) that shift the LHS of the OER. A discussion of comparative statics for all parameters is provided 
in section 4.4. 
(b) Compatibility costs decrease, 𝛥𝑚1 < 0.  
Deriving 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  in Figure 2:  
𝑢1 > 𝑢12 ⇔ 𝑞 + Δ𝑞 + 𝜇 − 𝑠 > 2𝑞 − (𝑚 + Δ𝑚
1). This implies 𝜇 > (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| + 𝑠) − 𝑚. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is 
given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| + 𝑠) − 𝑚. 
Deriving 𝐷𝐿2𝑎 and 𝐷𝐿2𝑏 in Figure 2: 
A user will not switch to Platform 1 whenever 𝑢1 ≤ 𝑢2 ⇔ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑠 − Δ𝑞. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿2𝑎 is given by 𝜇 = 𝑠 − Δ𝑞. 
A user will not switch to multihoming whenever 𝑢12 < 𝑢2 ⇔ 𝑚 > 𝑞 + |Δ𝑚
1| − 𝑠. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿2𝑏 is given by 𝑚 =
𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| − 𝑠. 
Deriving 𝐷𝐿2𝑐 in Figure 2: 
Platform 2 subscribers will switch to multihoming when 𝜇 ≤ 𝑠 − Δ𝑞 and  𝑚 ≤ 𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| − 𝑠 and to Platform 1 when 
𝜇 > 𝑠 − Δ𝑞 and  𝑚 > 𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| − 𝑠.  
If both 𝜇 > 𝑠 − Δ𝑞 and  𝑚 ≤ 𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1| − 𝑠 hold, then users will switch to the alternative that provides higher utility, 
choosing Platform 1 when 𝑢1 > 𝑢12 ⇔ 𝜇 > (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚
1|) − 𝑚  and multihoming when 𝑢1 ≤ 𝑢12 ⇔ 𝜇 ≤
(𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1|) − 𝑚. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿2𝑐 is given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚
1|) − 𝑚. 
Deriving Expansion Strategies: 
For Δ𝑚1 < 0  (all parameter values), Δ𝑏1 ≥ 0  and Δ𝑏2 ≤ 0  (as in (a)), while both Δ𝑏12 ≤ 0  and Δ𝑏12 ≥ 0  are 
possible. If Δ𝑏12 ≤ 0, then the analysis is the same as the case of Δ𝑚
1 > 0, and expansion is a dominant strategy for 
𝑐 = 0. If, on the other hand, Δ𝑏12 ≥ 0, then all non-cost components in the LHS of the OER are positive, and the 
inequality trivially holds for 𝑐 = 0. Summarizing, 𝑒1|?̅? ≡ 𝐸 for Δ𝑚
1 > 0, when 𝑐 = 0.  
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As before, we find 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑐𝐻 to derive the impact of 𝑐 on the optimal expansion strategy. For 𝑐𝐿 , we find the lowest 
𝜋1
𝐸?̅?. Again, min𝜋1
𝐸?̅?  is obtained for Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 = Δ𝑏12 = 0 (when only the ad-engagement effect drives expansion). 
The analysis is the same as for Δ𝑚1 > 0 and 𝑐𝐿|?̅?,Δ𝑚1<0 = 𝑐𝐿|?̅?,Δ𝑚1>0. Derivation of 𝑐𝐻 is also the same as in (a), and 
𝑐𝐻|?̅?,Δ𝑚1<0 = 𝑐𝐻|?̅?,Δ𝑚1>0 and we denote these bounds as 𝑐𝐿|?̅?, 𝑐𝐻|?̅? .  
Expansion Strategy When Rival Expands, 𝒆𝒊|𝑬.  
(a) Compatibility costs (weakly) increase, 𝛥𝑚2 ≥ 0.  
Deriving 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  in Figure 3: 
𝑢1 ≥ 𝑢12 ⇔  𝑞 + Δ𝑞 + 𝜇 − 𝑠 > 2𝑞 − (𝑚 + Δ𝑚
2). This implies 𝜇 > (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + 𝑠 − Δ𝑚2) − 𝑚. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is 
given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + 𝑠 − Δ𝑚2) − 𝑚.  
Deriving Expansion Strategies: 
For all parameter values, Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 ≥ 0  and Δ𝑏12 = −0.5Δ𝑏1 ≤ 0 . Substituting into the OER, 𝑒1|𝐸 = 𝐸 ⇔
  𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 + 𝜌(2 − 𝜌)Δ𝑏1 − 0.5𝜌(1 − 𝜌)Δ𝑏1 − 𝑐 ≥ 0 . Simplifying, the inequality becomes 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 +
𝜌(1.5 − 0.5𝜌)Δ𝑏1 − 𝑐 ≥ 0, and always holds for 𝑐 = 0. 
We proceed to derive 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑐𝐻. Again, 𝑐𝐿 is obtained for the case of no switching  Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 = Δ𝑏12 = 0, which 
implies 𝑐𝐿|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0 = 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 , where 𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 ≤ 0.5(1 − 𝑞)  (such that 𝑐𝐿|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0  depends on the parameters 
𝑐, 𝑠, 𝜌, Δ𝑞, Δ𝑚1, ?̅? and 𝑐𝐿|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0 ≤ 𝑐𝐿|?̅?. 
Similarly, 𝑐𝐻 is obtained for maximal switching, i.e., the case when all multihomers switch, for 𝑠 < Δ𝑚
2 − (𝑞 − Δ𝑞). 
Note that this condition implies 𝑠 < Δ𝑞 (since Δ𝑚2 < 𝑞) and thus 𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 = 0. Expansion is never optimal when 𝜋1
𝐸𝐸 <
𝜋1
?̅?𝐸, which implies 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0 = 0.5𝜌(2 − 𝜌) − 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏12
?̅?𝐸 ≥ 0.5𝜌(2 − 𝜌).40 
(b) Compatibility costs decrease, 𝛥𝑚2 < 0. 
Deriving 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  in Figure 4: 
𝑢1 ≥ 𝑢12 ⇔ 𝑞 + Δ𝑞 + 𝜇 − 𝑠 > 2𝑞 − (𝑚 + Δ𝑚
2). This implies 𝜇 > (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚2| + 𝑠) − 𝑚. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is 
given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚2| + 𝑠) − 𝑚. 
Deriving 𝐷𝐿1,2 in Figure 4: 
𝑢1 ≤ 𝑢12 ⇔ 𝑞 + Δ𝑞 + 𝜇 ≤ 2𝑞 − (𝑚 + Δ𝑚
2) − 𝑠. This implies 𝜇 ≤ (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚2| − 𝑠) − 𝑚. Therefore, 𝐷𝐿1,2 is 
given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚2| − 𝑠) − 𝑚. 
Deriving Expansion Strategies: 
Case (b1): When |Δ𝑚2| ≤ Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?, a larger mass of multihomers switch to the expanded platforms than vice versa. 
To see this, first note that |Δ𝑚2| ≤ Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅? implies |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞 < ?̅? − (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞). When 𝑠 > ?̅? − (|Δ𝑚2| −
Δ𝑞) there is no switching, and when 𝑠 ∈ (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞 < ?̅? − (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞)) only 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is binding and Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 >
0, Δ𝑏12 < 0. Finally, when 𝑠 < |Δ𝑚
2| − Δ𝑞, both decision lines are in effect, and |Δ𝑚2| ≤ Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅? ensures that 
Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 > 0, Δ𝑏12 < 0 continue to hold.
41 Overall, for |Δ𝑚2| ≤ Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?, we have Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 ≥ 0, Δ𝑏12 ≤ 0.  
Deriving 𝑐𝐿  and 𝑐𝐻  for |Δ𝑚
2| ≤ Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?: 𝑐𝐿  is obtained, as before, for the case of no switching  Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 =
Δ𝑏12 = 0 , which implies 𝑐𝐿|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1) = 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸  (recall that 𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 ≤ 0.5(1 − 𝑞)  and depends on 
𝑐, 𝑠, 𝜌, Δ𝑞, Δ𝑚1, ?̅?). Since 𝑐𝐿|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1) = 𝑐𝐿|𝐸,Δ𝑚2>0 denote both as 𝑐𝐿|𝐸 . 
To find 𝑐𝐻 we note that Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 = −0.5Δ𝑏12 are maximal when 𝑠 = 0, and 𝑐𝐻 follows from the OER. Expansion 
is, therefore, a dominated strategy when 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏1) = 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 + 𝜌2Δ𝑏1 , where Δ𝑏1 = 0.25?̅?[?̅? −
2(|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞)] and 𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 ≤ 0.5(1 − 𝑞) (further depending on the parameters). 
 
40 Both 𝑏12
?̅?𝐸 > 𝑏12
?̅??̅? and 𝑏12
?̅?𝐸 < 𝑏12
?̅??̅? are possible, and depend on parameter values (see Appendix C for a full characterization). 
41  This follows from comparing the areas of the triangles representing switching users in Figure 4, while employing 𝑠 <
(|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞) ≤ 0.5?̅?. 
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Case (b2): When |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?, a larger mass of singlehomers switch to multihoming than vice versa. To see 
this, first note that |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅? implies |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞 > ?̅? − (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞). When 𝑠 > |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞 there is no 
switching, and when 𝑠 ∈ (?̅? − (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞), |Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞)  only 𝐷𝐿1,2  is in effect and Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 < 0, Δ𝑏12 > 0 . 
Lastly, when  𝑠 < ?̅? − (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞), then both decision lines are in effect, and |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅?  ensures that 
Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 < 0, Δ𝑏12 > 0  continue to hold.
42  Overall, for |Δ𝑚2| > Δ𝑞 + 0.5?̅? , we have Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 ≤ 0, Δ𝑏12 =
2Δ𝑏1 ≥ 0. Now, expansion is no longer a dominant strategy, and no-expansion may be optimal even when expansion 
is costless. This follows from the OER, which becomes 𝑒1|𝐸 = 𝐸 ⇔   𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 + 𝜌2𝛥𝑏1 − 𝑐 ≥ 0. For 𝑐 = 0, 
𝑒1|𝐸 = 𝐸 when |𝛥𝑏1| ≤
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝑏1
?̅?𝐸 , and otherwise 𝑒1|𝐸 = ?̅?. Since expansion is no longer a dominant strategy for 𝑐 = 0, 
there is no lower bound for the expansion cost. The expansion cost that will preclude expansion when switching to the 
expanded platform is maximal, 𝑐𝐻, is derived from the OER with Δ𝑏1 = Δ𝑏2 = Δ𝑏12 = 0, and thus 𝑐𝐻|𝐸,Δ𝑚2<0,(𝑏2) =
𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝑏1
?̅?𝐸. 
 
42 This follows from comparing the areas of the triangles representing switching users in Figure 4, while employing 𝑠 < ?̅? −
(|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞) and (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞) > 0.5?̅?. 
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Appendix C. Deriving Possible Domains for Decision Lines in Figures 1-4: 
Figure 1 Domains. 
𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + 𝑠 − Δ𝑚
1) − 𝑚 . No multihomers switch when 𝜇(𝑚 = 𝑞) > ?̅? ⇔ 𝑠 > ?̅? + Δ𝑞 +
Δ𝑚1. 
𝐷𝐿2 is given by 𝜇 = 𝑠 − Δ𝑞. No singlehomers switch when 𝑠 > ?̅? + Δ𝑞. 
Figure C1 summarizes the decision lines’ domains and the resulting changes in 𝐵 in each domain. 
 
 
Figure C1. Domains for 𝑫𝑳𝑴𝑯, 𝑫𝑳𝟐 and the Resulting Changes in 𝑩 in Each Domain 
 
Figure 2 Domains: 
𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + 𝑠 + |Δ𝑚
1|) − 𝑚. No multihomers switch when 𝜇(𝑚 = 𝑞) > ?̅? ⇔ 𝑠 > ?̅? + Δ𝑞 −
|Δ𝑚1|. 
𝐷𝐿2𝑎 , 𝐷𝐿2𝑏  and 𝐷𝐿2𝑐  are given by 𝜇 = 𝑠 − Δ𝑞 , 𝑚 = 𝑞 + |Δ𝑚
1| − 𝑠 and 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + |Δ𝑚1|) − 𝑚. There is no 
switching from 𝑏2 to 𝑏1 when 𝑠 > ?̅? + Δ𝑞. There is no switching from 𝑏2 to 𝑏12 when 𝑠 > |Δ𝑚
1|. The third decision 
line 𝐷𝐿2𝑐 is in effect when 𝑠 ≤ min{|Δ𝑚
1|, ?̅? + Δ𝑞}, and when this holds, users in 𝑏2 will switch to both 𝑏1 and 𝑏12. 
We consider the following three domains for 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻 ,𝐷𝐿2𝑎, 𝐷𝐿2𝑏: (A) |Δ𝑚
1| ≤ ?̅? + Δ𝑞 − |Δ𝑚1|; (B) |Δ𝑚1| ∈ (?̅? +
Δ𝑞 − |Δ𝑚1|, ?̅? + Δ𝑞); (C) |Δ𝑚1| > ?̅? + Δ𝑞 . Figure C2 summarizes the decision lines’ domains and the resulting 
changes in 𝐵 in each domain 
 
(A) 
 
(B) 
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(C) 
 
 Figure C2. Domains for 𝑫𝑳𝑴𝑯,𝑫𝑳𝟐𝒂, 𝑫𝑳𝟐𝒃 and the Resulting Changes in 𝑩 in Each Domain: (A) |𝚫𝒎
𝟏| ≤
?̅? + 𝚫𝒒 − |𝚫𝒎𝟏|; (B) |𝚫𝒎𝟏| ∈ (?̅? + 𝚫𝒒 − |𝚫𝒎𝟏|, ?̅? + 𝚫𝒒); (C) |𝚫𝒎𝟏| > ?̅? + 𝚫𝒒. 
 
Figure 3 Domains: 
𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + 𝑠 − Δ𝑚
2) − 𝑚 . No multihomers switch when 𝜇(𝑚 = 𝑞) > ?̅? ⇔ 𝑠 > ?̅? + Δ𝑞 +
Δ𝑚2. 
Figure C3 summarizes the decision line’s domains and the resulting changes in 𝐵 in each domain. 
 
 
Figure C3. Domains for 𝑫𝑳𝑴𝑯 and the Resulting Changes in 𝑩 in Each Domain. 
 
Figure 4 Domains: 
𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻  is given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 + 𝑠 + |Δ𝑚
2|) − 𝑚 . No multihomers switch when 𝜇(𝑚 = 𝑞) > ?̅? ⇔ 𝑠 > ?̅? −
(|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞). 
𝐷𝐿1,2 is given by 𝜇 = (𝑞 − Δ𝑞 − 𝑠 + |Δ𝑚
2|) − 𝑚. No singlehomers switch when 𝜇(𝑚 = 𝑞) < 0 ⇔ 𝑠 > (|Δ𝑚2| −
Δ𝑞). 
We thus consider the following two domains for 𝐷𝐿𝑀𝐻 ,𝐷𝐿1,2: (A) (|Δ𝑚
2| − Δ𝑞) ≤ 0.5?̅?; (B) (|Δ𝑚2| − Δ𝑞) > 0.5?̅?. 
Figure C4 summarizes the decision lines’ domains and the resulting changes in 𝐵 in each domain. 
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Figure C4. Domains for 𝑫𝑳𝑴𝑯,𝑫𝑳𝟏,𝟐 and the Resulting Changes in 𝑩 in Each Domain: (A) (|𝚫𝒎
𝟐| − 𝚫𝒒) ≤ 𝟎. 𝟓?̅? 
; (B) (|𝚫𝒎𝟐| − 𝚫𝒒) > 𝟎. 𝟓?̅?. 
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